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Abstract
A mean-field-type game is a game in which the instantaneous payoffs
and/or the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the
action profile but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs.This
article presents engineering applications of mean-field-type games.
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1 Introduction
With the ever increasing amounts of data becoming available, strategic data
analysis and decision-making will become more pervasive as a necessary in-
gredient for societal infrastructures. In many network engineering games, the
performance metrics depend on some few aggregates of the parameters/choices.
A typical example is the congestion field in traffic engineering where classical
cars and smart autonomous driverless cars create traffic congestion levels on
the roads. The congestion field can be learned, for example by means of crowd-
sensing, and can be used for efficient and accurate prediction of the end-to-end
delays of commuters. Another example is the interference field where it is the
aggregate-received signal of the other users that matters rather than their in-
dividual input signal. In such games, in order for a transmitter-receiver pair
to determine his best-replies, it is unnecessary that the pair is informed about
the other users’ strategies. If a user is informed about the aggregative terms
given her own strategy, she will be able to efficiently exploit such information
to perform better. In these situations the outcome is influenced not only by
the state-action profile but also by the distribution of it. The interaction can
be captured by a game with distribution-dependent payoffs called mean-field-
type games (MFTG). An MFTG is basically a game in which the instantaneous
payoffs and/or the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the
action profile of the agents but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs.
∗B. Djehiche is with Department of Mathematics, KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
Stockholm, Sweden
†A. Tcheukam and H. Tembine are with Learning and Game Theory Lab, New York
University Abu Dhabi. Email: tembine@nyu.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
03
28
1v
3 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
9 N
ov
 20
17
The main contributions of this article can be summarized as follows. The
first contribution of this article is the review of some relevant engineering appli-
cations of MFTG. Considering Liouville type systems with drift, diffusion and
jumps, that are dependent on time-delays, state mean-field and action mean-
field terms. Proposition 7 establishes an equilibrium equation for non-convex
action spaces. Proposition 9 provides a stochastic maximum principle that cov-
ers decentralized information and partial observation systems which are crucial
in engineering systems. Various engineering applications in discrete or con-
tinuous variables (state, action or time) are provided. Explicit solutions are
provided in propositions 6 and 8 which are mean-field type game problems with
non-quadratic costs.
The article is structured as follows. The next section overviews earlier works
on static mean-field games, followed by discrete time mean-field games with
measure-dependent transition kernels. Then, a basic MFTG with finite number
of agents is presented. After that, the discussion is divided into two illustrations
in each of the following areas of engineering (Figure 1) : Civil Engineering (CE),
Electrical Engineering (EE), Computer Engineering (CompE), Mechanical En-
gineering (ME), General Engineering (GE).
• CE: road traffic networks with random incident states and multi-level
building evacuation
• EE: Millimeter wave wireless communications and distributed power net-
works
• CompE: Virus spread over networks and virtual machine resource man-
agement in cloud networks
• ME: Synchronization of oscillators, consensus, alignment and energy-efficient
buildings
• GE: Online meeting: strategic arrivals and starting time and mobile crowd-
sensing as a public good.
The article proceeds by presenting the effect of time delays of coupled mean-field
dynamical systems and decentralized information structure. Then, a discussion
on the drawbacks, limitations, and challenges of MFTGs is highlighted. Lastly,
a summary of the article and concluding remarks are presented.
1.1 Mean-Field Games: Static Setup
A static mean-field game is one in which all users make choices (or select a strat-
egy) simultaneously, without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen
by other users and the game is played once. Any mean-field game with sequen-
tial moves is a dynamic mean-field game. In this work, games which are played
more than once will be considered as dynamic game. This subsection overviews
static mean-field games and games in which the underlying processes are in
stationary regime (time-independent). Mean-field games have been around for
quite some time in one form or another, especially in transportation networks
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Figure 1: MFTG with engineering applications covered in this work.
and in competitive economy. In the context of competitive market with large
number of agents, a 1936 article [1] captures the assumption made in mean-field
games with large number of agents, in which the author states:
“each of the participants has the opinion that its own actions do not influence
the prevailing price”.
Another comment on the impact on the population mean-field term was
given in [2] page 13:
“ When the number of participants becomes large, some hope emerges that
of the influence of every particular participant will become negligible . . . ”
The population interaction involves many agents for each type or class and
location, a common approach is to replace the individual agents’ variables and
to use continuous variables to represent the aggregate average of type-location-
actions. In the large population regime, the mean field limit is then modeled
by state-action and location-dependent time process (see Figure 2). This type
of aggregate models are also known as non-atomic or population games. It is
closely related to the mass-action interpretation in [3], Equation (4) in page 287.
In the context of transportation networks, the mean-field game framework,
underlying the key foundation, goes back to the pioneering works of [4] in the
1950s. Therein, the basic idea is to describe and understand interacting traf-
fic flows among a large population of agents moving from multiple sources to
destinations, and interacting with each other. The congestion created on the
road and at the intersection are subject to capacity and flow constraints. This
corresponds to a constrained mean-field game problem as noted in [5]. A com-
mon behavioral assumption in the study of transportation and communication
networks is that travelers or packets, respectively, choose routes that they per-
ceive as being the shortest under the prevailing traffic conditions. As noted
in [6], collection of individual decisions may result to a situation which drivers
cannot reduce their journey times by unilaterally choosing another route. The
work in [6] such a resulting traffic pattern as an equilibrium. Nowadays, it is
indeed known as the Wardrop equilibrium [4, 7], and it is thought of as a steady
state obtained after a transient phase in which travelers successively adjust their
3
Figure 2: Each agent is with its own state and own mean-field interacts with
the aggregates from the rest of the population. The population mean-field is
formed from the reaction of the agents and affects the behavior of the individual
agents and their own mean-field.
route choices until a situation with stable route travel costs and route flows has
been reached [8, 9]. In the seminal contribution [4], page 345 the author stated
two principles that formalize this notion of equilibrium and the alternative pos-
tulates of the minimization of the total travel costs. His first principle reads:
“The journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than
those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route.”
Wardrop’s first principle of route choice, which is identical to the notion
postulated in [10, 6], became widely used as a sound and simple behavioral
principle to describe the spreading of trips over alternate routes due to congested
conditions. Since its introduction in the context of transportation networks in
1952 and its mathematical formalization by [5, 11] transportation planners have
been using Wardrop equilibrium models to predict commuters decisions in real-
life networks.
The key congestion factor is the flow or the fraction of travelers per edge
on the roads (see Application 1). The above Wardrop problem is indeed a
mean-field on a discrete space. The exact mean-field term here corresponds to a
mean-field of actions (a choice of a route). Putting this in the context of infinite
number of commuters results to end-to-end travel times that are function of own
choice of a route and the mean-field distribution of travelers across the graph
(network).
In a population context, the equilibrium concept of [4] corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium of the mean-field game with infinite number of agents. The works
[7, 12] provide a variational formulation of the (static) mean-field equilibrium.
The game theoretic models such as evolutionary games [13, 14, 15], global
games [16, 17], anonymous games, aggregative games [18], population games
[19, 20, 21], and large games, share several common features. Static mean-field
games with large number of agents were widely investigated (see [22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27] and the references therein).
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1.2 Mean-Field Games: Dynamic Setup
This section overviews mean-field games which are dynamic (time-varying and
played more than once) and their applications in engineering.
Definition 1 (Mean-Field Game: Infinite Regime). A (homogeneous popula-
tion) mean-field game (MFG) is a game in which the instantaneous payoff of a
generic agent (say 1) and/or the state dynamics coefficient functions involve an
individual state-action pair x1t, u1t and the distribution of state-action pairs of
the other decision-makers, mt at time t. The individual state and action spaces
are identical across the homogeneous population denoted by Xi = X1, Uj = U1
for all i. The state transition to the next state follows P(.|x1t, u1t,mt). Thus,
the instant payoff function of a generic agent (say j) has the following structure:
ri = r1 = r : X1 × U1 × P(X1 × U1)→ R,
with r(x1t, u1t,mt).
The mean-field game model has been extended to include several other fea-
tures such as incomplete information, common noise, heterogeneous population,
finite population or a mixture between finite number of clusters and infinite pop-
ulation regimes.
The key ingredients of dynamic mean-field games appeared in [28, 29] in the
early 1980s. The work in [28] proposes a game-theoretic model that explains
why smaller firms grow faster and are more likely to fail than larger firms in
large economies. The game is played over a discrete time space. Therein, the
mean-field is the aggregate demand/supply which generates a price dynamics.
The price moves forwardly, and the agents react to the price and generate a
demand and the firm produces a supply with associated cost, which regenerates
the next price and so on. The author introduced a backward-forward system to
find equilibria (see for example Section 4, equations D.1 and D.2 in [28]). The
backward equation is obtained as an optimality to the individual response, i.e.,
the value function associated with the best response to price, and the forward
equation for the evolution of price. Therein, the consistency check is about
the mean-field of equilibrium actions (population or mass of actions), that is,
the equilibrium price solves a fixed-point system: the price regenerated after
the reaction of the agents through their individual best-responses should be
consistent with the price they responded to.
Following that analogy, a more general framework was developed in [29],
where the mean-field equilibrium is introduced in the context of dynamic games
with large number of decision-makers. A mean-field equilibrium is defined in
[29], page 80 by two conditions: (1) each generic agent’s action is best-response
to the mean-field, and (2) the mean-field is consistent and is exactly reproduced
from the reactions of the agents. This matching argument was widely used in
the literature as it can be interpreted as a generic agent reacting to an evolving
mean-field object and at the same time the mean-field is formed from the con-
tributions of all the agents. The authors of [30] show how common noise can be
introduced into the mean-field game model (the mean-field distribution evolves
stochastically) and extend the Jovanovic-Rosenthal existence theorem [29].
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Table 1: Some applications of MFTGs in Engineering. HVAC stands for (heat-
ing, ventilation and air conditioning) systems. D2D stands for Device-to-Device
(D2D)
Area Works
planning [72]
state estimation and filtering [73, 74]
synchronization [75, 76, 77, 78]
opinion formation [79]
network security [80, 81, 82, 83, 84]
power control [85, 86, 87]
medium access control [88, 89]
cognitive radio networks [90, 91]
electrical vehicles [92, 93]
scheduling [94]
cloud networks [95, 96, 97]
wireless networks [98]
auction [99, 100]
cyber-physical systems [101, 102]
airline networks [103]
sensor networks [104]
traffic networks [105, 106, 107, 108]
big data [109]
D2D networks [110, 111, 112]
multilevel building evacuation [140, 141, 142, 143]
power networks [113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 174, 179]
[118, 119, 120, 93, 121]
[122, 123, 124]
HVAC [125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130]
Continuous time version of the works [28, 29] can be found in [31, 32, 33, 34].
The reader is referred to [36, 37, 38, 42, 39, 40, 41] for recent development of
mean-field game theory. The authors [43, 44, 33, 45, 46, 47] have developed a
powerful tool for modelling strategic behavior of large population of agents, each
of them having a negligible impact on the population mean-field term. Weak
solutions of mean-field games are analyzed in [48], Markov jumps processes
[49, 50], and leader-followers models in [51]. Finite state mean-field game mod-
els were analyzed in [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59]. Team and social optimum
solutions can be found in [60, 61, 62, 51, 63]. The work in [64, 65, 66] pro-
vide mean-field convergence of a class of McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Numerical
methods for mean-field games can be found in [67, 68, 69, 70].
Table 1 summarizes some engineering applications of mean-field-type game
models.
1.2.1 Limitations of the existing mean-field game models
Most of the existing mean-field game models share the following assumptions:
Big size: A typical assumption is to consider an infinite number decision-
makers, sometimes, a continuum of decision-makers. The idea of a continuum of
decision-makers may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger
than a continuum of particles used in fluid mechanics, in water distribution,
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or in petroleum engineering. In terms of practice and experiment however,
decision-making problems with continuum of decision-makers is rarely observed
in engineering. There is a huge difference between a fluid with a continuum of
particles and a decision-making problem with a continuum of agents. Agents
may physically occupy a space (think of agents inside a building or a stadium)
or a resource, and the size or number of agents that most of engineering systems
can handle can be relatively large or growing but remain currently finite [71].
It is in part due to the limited resource per shot or limited number of servers
at a time. In all the examples and applications provided below, we still have a
finite number of interacting agents. Thus, this assumption appears to be very
restrictive in terms of engineering applications.
Anonymity: The index of the decision-maker does not affect the utility.
The agents are assumed to be indistinguishable within the same class or type.
The drawback of this assumption is that most individual decision-makers in
engineering are in fact not necessarily anonymous (think of Google, Microsoft,
Twitter, Facebook, Tesla), the classical mean-field game model is inappropriate,
and does not apply to such situations. In mean-field games with several types
(or multi-population mean-field games), it is still assumed that there is large
number of agents per type/class/population, which is not realistic in most of
the engineering applications considered in this work.
NonAtomicity: A single decision-maker has a negligible effect on the mean-
field-term and on the global utility. One typical example where this assumption
is not satisfied is a situation of targeting a room comfort temperature, in which
the air conditioning controller adjusts the heating/cooling depending on the
temperature in the room, the temperatures of the other connecting zones and
the ambient temperature. It is clear that the decision of the controller to heat
or to cool affect the variance of the temperature inside the room. Thus, the
effect of the individual action of that controller on the temperature distribution
(mean-field) inside the room cannot be neglected.
To summarize, the above conditions appear to be very restrictive in terms
of engineering applications, and to overcome this issue a more flexible MFTG
framework has been proposed.
1.2.2 What MFTGs can bring to the existing decision-making mod-
els?
MFTGs not only relax of the above assumptions but also incorporate the be-
havior of the agents as well as their effects in the mean-field terms and in the
outcomes (see Table 2).
(1) In MFTGs, the number of users can be finite or infinite.
(2) The indistinguishability property (invariance in law by permutation of
index of the users) is not assumed in MFTGs.
(3) A single user may have a non-negligible impact of the mean-field terms,
specially in the distribution of own-states and own mixed strategies.
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Table 2: Key limitations and differences between the game models
Area Anonymity Infinity Atom
population games [4, 5] yes yes no
evolutionary games [131] yes yes no
non-atomic games [29] yes yes no
aggregative games [18] relaxed
global games [16, 17] yes yes no
large games [22] yes yes no
anonymous games [29] yes yes no
mean-field games yes yes no
nonasymptotic mean-field games nearly no yes
MFTG relaxed relaxed relaxed
These properties (1)-(3) make strong differences between mean-field games and
MFTGs (see [132] and the references therein).
MFTG seems to be more appropriate in such engineering situations because
it does not assume indistinguishability, it captures the effect of each agent in the
distribution and the number of agents is arbitrary as we will see below. Table
3 summarizes the notations used in the manuscript.
Table 3: Table of Notations
I , set of decision-makers
T , Length of the horizon
[0, T ] , horizon of the mean-field-type game
t , time index
X , state space
W , Brownian motion
σ , Diffusion coefiicient
N , Poisson jump process
γ , Jump rate coefiicient
Ui , control action space of agent i ∈ I
Ui , admissible strategy space
ui , state space
ri , instantaneous payoff
D(x,u) , distribution of state-action
Ri , Long-term payoff functional
1.3 Background on MFTGs
This section presents a background on MFTGs.
Definition 2 (Mean-Field-Type Game). A mean-field-type game (MFTG) is a
game in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or the state dynamics coefficient
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functions involve not only the state and the action profile but also the joint
distributions of state-action pairs (or its marginal distributions, i.e., the distri-
butions of states or the distribution of actions). Let I be the set of agents, Xi
the state space of agent i and X := ∏i∈I Xi = X1 × X2 × . . . the state profiles
space of all agents. Ui is the action space of agent i and U =
∏
j Uj is the action
profile space of all agents. A typical example of payoff function of agent j has
the following structure:
ri : X × U × P(X × U)→ R,
with ri(x, u,D(x,u)) where (x, u) is the state-action profile of the agents and
D(x,u) is the distribution of the state-action pair (x, u). X is the state space, U
is the action profile space of all agents and P(X × U) is the set of probability
measures over X × U.
From Definition 2, a mean-field-type game can be static or dynamic in time.
One may think that MFTG is a small and particular class of games. How-
ever, this class includes the classical games in strategic form because any payoff
function ri(x, u) can be written as ri(x, u,D).
When randomized/mixed strategies are used in the von Neumann-type pay-
off, the resulting payoff can be written as E[ri(x, u)] =
∫
ri(x, u)D(x,u)(dx, du) =
rˆi(D). Thus, the form ri(x, u,D) is more general and includes non-von Neumann
payoff functions.
Example 1 (Mean-variance payoff). The payoff function of agent i is E[ri(x, u)]−
λ
√
var[ri(x, u)], λ ∈ R which can be written as a function of ri(x, u,D(x,u)). For
any number of interacting agents, the term D(xi,ui) plays a non-negligible role
in the standard deviation
√
var[ri(x, u)]. Therefore, the impact of agent i in the
individual mean-field term D(xi,ui) cannot be neglected.
Example 2 (Aggregative games). The payoff function of each agent depends
on its own action and an aggregative term of the other actions. Example of
payoff functions include ri(ui,
∑
j 6=i u
α
j ), α > 0 and ri(xiui,
∑
j 6=i xjuj).
In the non-atomic setting, the influence of an individual state xi and indi-
vidual action ui of any agent i will have a negligible impact on mean-field term
Dˆ(x,u) = limn→+∞ 1n−1
∑
j 6=i δ{xj ,uj}. In that case, one gets to the so-called
mean-field game.
Example 3 (Population games). Consider a large population of agents. Each
agent has a certain state/type x ∈ X and can choose a control action u ∈ U(x).
Let the proportion of type-action of the population as m. The payoff of the
agent with type/state x, control action u when the population profile m is
r(x, u,m). Global games with continuum of agents were studied in [16] based on
the Bayesian games of [17], which uses the proportion of actions.
In the case where both non-atomic and atomic terms are involved in the
payoff, one can write the payoff as ri(x, u,D, Dˆ) where Dˆ is the population
state-action measure. Agent i may influence Di (distribution of its own state-
action pairs) but its influence on Dˆ may be limited.
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The main goals of static mean-field-type games are: (1) identify solution
concepts [35] such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium, correlated equi-
librium, Stackelberg solution etc. (2) Computation of solution concepts. (3)
Development of algorithms and learning procedures to reach and select efficient
equilibria, (4) Mechanism design for incentivizing agents. The next section
presents a class of dynamic MFTGs which are played over several stages.
2 A Basic Dynamic MFTG: Finite Regime
Consider a basic MFTG with n ≥ 2 agents interacting over horizon [0, T ], T >
0. The individual state dynamics of agent i is given by
dxi = bi
(
xi, ui, D(xi,ui),
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,uk)
n−1
)
dt+ σi
(
xi, ui, D(xi,ui),
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,uk)
n−1
)
dWi,
xi(0) ∼ Di,0
(1)
and the payoff functional of agent i is
Ri(u) = gi
(
xi(T ), Dxi(T ),
∑
k 6=i δxk(T )
n− 1
)
+
∫ T
0
ri
(
xi, ui, D(xi,ui),
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,uk)
n− 1
)
dt, (2)
where the strategy profile is u = (u1, . . . , un), which also denoted as (ui, u−i).
The functions bi, σi, gi, ri are measurable functions. xi(t) := xi(t)[u] is the state
of agents i under of the strategy profile u, Dxi(t) = L(xi(t)) is the probability
distribution (law) of xi(t). D(xi(t),ui(t)) = L(xi(t), ui(t)) is the probability dis-
tribution of the state-control action pair (xi(t), ui(t)) of agent i at time t. δy is
the δ−Dirac measure concentrated at y, and Wi is a standard Brownian motion
defined over the filtration (Ω,P, (Ft)t≤T ).
The novelty in the modelling of (1)-(2) is that each individual agent i in-
fluences its own mean-field terms Dxi(t), and D(xi(t),ui(t)) independently on the
total number of interacting agents. In particular, the influence of agent i on
those mean-field terms remain non-negligible even when there is a continuum
of agents. The distributions Dxi and D(xi,ui) represent two important terms in
the modeling of MFTGs. These terms are referred to as individual mean-field
terms. In the finite regime, the other agents are captured by the empirical mea-
sures
∑
k 6=i δxk
n−1 and
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,uk)
n−1 . We refer these terms to as population mean-field
terms.
Similarly, a basic discrete time (discrete or continuous state) MFTG is given
by
xi,t+1 ∼ qi
(
.|xi,t, ui,t, D(xi,t,ui,t),
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,t,uk,t)
n−1
)
,
xi0 ∼ Di,0
Ri(u) = gi
(
xi,T , Dxi,T ,
∑
k 6=i δxk,T
n−1
)
+
∑T−1
t=0 ri
(
xi,t, ui,t, D(xi,t,ui,t),
∑
k 6=i δ(xk,t,uk,t)
n−1
)
,
(3)
where qi(.|.) is the transition kernel of agent i to next states.
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Mean-field-type control and global optimization can be found in [134, 36,
133, 172, 173, 175]. The models (1) and (3) are easily adapted to bargaining
solution, cooperative and coalitional MFTGs and can be found in [135, 176, 177].
Psychological MFTG was recently introduced in [111, 178] where spitefulness,
altruism, selfishness, reciprocity of the agents are examined by means empathy,
other-regarding behavior and psychological factors.
Definition 3. An admissible control strategy of agent i is an Fi−adapted and
square integrable process with values in a non-empty subset Ui. Denote by
Ui = L2Fi([0, T ], Ui) the class of admissible control strategies of agent i.
Definition 4 (Best response). Given a strategy profile of the other agents
(u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un), with uj , j 6= i that are admissible and the mean-
field terms D, the best response problem of agent i is:{
sup
ui∈Ui
E [Ri(u)],
subject to (1)
(4)
The first goal is to find and characterize the best response strategies of each
user. For user i it consists to solve problem (4). In problem (4), the information
structure that is available to user plays in important role. We will distinguish
three type of strategies: (1) open-loop strategies that are only measurable func-
tion of t, (2) state-feedback strategies that are measurable functions of state and
time, (3) state-and-mean-field feedback strategies that measurable functions of
state, mean-field and time. To solve problem (4), four different methods have
been developed:
• Direct approach which consists to write the payoff functional in a form
such that the optimal value and optimizers are trivially obtained, and a
verification and validation procedure follows.
• A stochastic maximum principle (Pontryagin’s approach) which provides
necessary conditions for optimality.
• A dynamic programming principle (Bellman’s approach) which consists to
write the value of the problem (per agent) in (backward) recursion form,
or as solution to a dynamical system.
• Uncertainty quantification approach by means of Wiener chaos expansion
of all the stochastic terms and the use of Kosambi-Karhunen-Loeve ex-
pansion which is a representation of a stochastic process as an infinite
linear combination of orthogonal functions, analogous to a Fourier series
representation of a function over a bounded domain.
If every user solves its best-response problem, the resulting system will be a
Nash equilibrium system defined below.
Definition 5. A (Nash) equilibrium of the game is a strategy profile (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n)
such that for every agent i,
E[Ri(u∗)] ≥ E[Ri(u∗1, . . . , u∗i−1, ui, u∗i+1, . . . , u∗n)],
for all ui ∈ Ui.
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The second goal is to find and characterize Nash equilibria of the mean-field-
type game. We provide below a basic example in which the Nash equilibrium
problem can be solved semi-explicitly using Riccati system.
Example 4 (Network Security Investment [80] ). A graph is connected if there
is a path that joins any point to any other point in the graph. Consider n ≥
2 decision-makers over a connected graph. Thus, the security of a node is
influenced by the others through possibly multiple hops. The effort of user
i in security investment is ui. The associated cost may include money (e.g.,
for purchasing antivirus software), time and energy (e.g., for system scanning,
patching). Let x(t) be the security level of the network at time t and
Ri(u) = − 12 [x(T )− Ex(T )]2 +
∫ T
0
qi(t)x(t)(1− i(t)x(t))− ρi(t)ui(t)− ri(t)2 u2i (t)dt.
(5)
The best-response of user i to (u−i, E[x]) := (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un, E[x]),
solves the following linear-quadratic mean-field-type control problem supui∈Ui E [Ri(u1, . . . , un)] , subject todx = {−ax− a¯E[x] +∑ni=1 biui} dt+ cxdW,
x(0) ∈ R,
(6)
where, qi(t) ≥ 0, i(t) ≥ 0, ρi(t) ≥ 0, ri(t) > 0 and a, a¯, bi, c are real numbers
and where E[x(t)] is the expected value of network security level created by
all users under the control action profile (u1, . . . , un). Note that the expected
value of the terminal term in Ri can be seen as a weighted variance of the state
[130] since E[(x(t) − E[x(t)])2] = var(x(t)). The optimal control action is in
state-and-mean-field feedback form:
u∗i (t) = − biri(t) [βi(t)x(t) + η1i(t)E[x(t)] + η2i(t)]−
ρi(t)
ri(t)
,
0 = β˙i + (−2a+ c2)βi − βi
∑n
j=1
b2j
rj
βj + 2qii,
βi(T ) = 1,
η˙1i − 2(a+ a¯)η1i − 2a¯βi − βi
∑n
j=1
b2j
rj
η1j − η1i
∑n
j=1
b2j
rj
(βj + η1j) = 0,
η1i(T ) = −1,
η˙2i − (a+ a¯)η2i − βi
∑n
j=1
bj
rj
(bjη2j + ρj)− η1i
∑n
j=1
bj
rj
(bjη2j + ρj)− qi = 0,
η2i(T ) = 0.
Figure 3 plots the optimal cost trajectory with the step size 2−8, the hori-
zon is [0, 1], the other parameters are b = 5, r = 1, q = 1, ρ = 0.0001,  = 0.1.
Figure 4 plots the optimal state vs the equilibrium state. As noted in [136], the
security state is higher when there is a cooperation between the users and when
the coalition formation cost is small enough. The inefficiency of Nash equilibria
behavior is widely known in game theory in which the Nash equilibrium can be
inefficient compared to the global optimum of the system. The relative payoff
difference between the worse Nash equilibrium payoff and global optimum payoff
have been proposed in the literature [180, 183] as measure of inefficiency. An-
other measure of inefficiency is the Price of anarchy, which has been proposed in
[181, 182]. It measures the ratio between the worse Nash equilibrium payoff and
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global optimum payoff. Note however that, one needs to be careful by taking
a ratio here, because the denominator may vanish in our context. Note that
restricting the analysis to the set of symmetric strategies may lead to perfor-
mance degradation [173] as symmetric Nash equilibria may not be performant
even in symmetric games. Thus, looking at −Nash equilibria via mean-field
limiting behavior does not help in improving the efficiency of Nash equilibria.
Figure 3: Optimal cost over time.
Example 4 can be used in the discrete-time mean-field-type game problem
(4) associated with (3). It corresponds to a variance reduction problem which
is widely used in risk quantification. The following example solves a distributed
variance reduction problem in discrete time using MFTG.
Example 5 (Distributed Mean-Variance Paradigm, [137]). The best response
problem of agent i is
infui∈Ui
{
qiT var(xT ) + (qiT + q¯iT )(E[xT ])
2
+
∑T−1
t=0 qitvar(xt) + (qit + q¯it)(E[xt])
2 +
∑T−1
t=0 ritvar(uit) + rit(Euit)
2
}
subject to
xt+1 = {axt + a¯Ext +
∑n
i=1 biuit}+ σW (t),
x0 ∼ L(X0), E[X0] = m0,
(7)
given the strategies (uj)j 6=i of the other agents than i.
Under the assumption that for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, and qjt ≥ 0, (qjt + q¯jt) ≥
13
Figure 4: Optimal vs equilibrium state trajectory over time. The secu-
rity level induced at equilibrium state is lower than the one induced at
full cooperation.
0, rjt > 0, there exists a unique best-response of agent i and it is given by
ui,t = ηit(xt − Ext) + η¯itExt,
ηit = − [abiβi,t+1+biβi,t+1
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
rit+b2iβi,t+1
,
η¯it = − biγi,t+1(a+a¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯j,t)
rit+b2iγi,t+1
,
βit = qit + βi,t+1{a2 + 2a
∑
j 6=i bjηjt + [
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
2} − [abiβi,t+1+biβi,t+1
∑
j 6=i bjηjt]
2
rit+b2iβi,t+1
,
βiT = qiT ≥ 0
γit = (qit + q¯it) + γi,t+1(a+ a¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯j,t)
2 − (biγi,t+1(a+a¯+
∑
j 6=i bj η¯j,t))
2
rit+b2iγi,t+1
,
γiT = qiT + q¯iT ≥ 0
(8)
and the best response cost of agent i is
E[Li(u)] = Eβi0(x0 − Ex0)2 + γi0(Ex0)2 +
T−1∑
t=0
βi,t+1σ
2.
In both examples 4 and 5 the optimal strategy of agent i is a feedback
function of the state and the expected value of the state. This structure is
different than the one obtained in classical stochastic optimal control which are
mean-field-free. The methodology used in standard stochastic game problems
do not apply directly to the mean-field-type game problems. These techniques
need to be extended. This leads new optimality systems [36, 179].
14
3 Engineering Applications
3.1 Civil Engineering
This subsection discusses two applications of MFTG in civil engineering.
Application 1 (Road Traffic over Networks ). The example below concerns
transportation networks under dynamic flow and possible stochastic incidents
on the lanes. Consider a network (V,L), where V is a finite set of nodes and
L ⊆ V × V is a set of directed links. n users share the network (V,L). Let R be
the set of possible routes in the network. A user with a given source-destination
pair arrives in the system at source node s and leaves it at the destination node
d after visiting a series of nodes and links, which we refer to as a route or path.
Denote by cwi (xt, uit,mt) the average w−weighted cost for the path uit when
mt fraction of users choose that path at time t and xt is the incident state on
the route. The weight w simply depicts that the effective cost is the weighted
sum of several costs depending on certain objectives. These metrics could be
the delayed costs, queueing times, memory costs, etc and can be weighted by w
in the multi-objective case. We define two regimes for the traffic game: a finite
regime game with n drivers denoted by Gn and an infinite regime game denoted
by G∞. The basic components of these games are (N ,X ,R, I = {x}, ci(x, .)). A
pure strategy of driver i is a mapping from the information set I to a choice of
a route that belongs to R. The set of pure strategies of a user is RX .
An action profile (route selection) (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Rn is an equilibrium of the
finite mean-field-type game if for every user i the following holds:
ci(x, ui,m(x, ui)) ≤ ci(x, u′i,m(x, u′i) +
1
n
),∀u′i ∈ R,
for the realized state x.
The term + 1n is the contribution of the deviating user to the new route.
When n is sufficiently large the state-dependent equilibrium notion becomes a
population profile m(x) = (m(x, u))u∈R such that for every user i
m(x, u) > 0 =⇒ ci(x, u,m(x, u)) ≤ ci(x, u′,m(x, u′)),
for the realized state x and for all u′ ∈ R. We refer to the equilibrium defined
above as 0−Nash equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium profile depends on the
realized state x.
We now discuss the existence conditions.
The equilibrium conditions can be rewritten in the form of variational in-
equalities: for each state x, (∗) ∑u∈R[m(x, u) − y(x, u)]c(x, u,m(x, u)) ≤ 0,
for all y. Hence, the existence of an equilibrium is reduced to the existence of
a solution to the variational inequality (*). By the standard fixed-point argu-
ments, we know from [138] that for each single state, such a population game
has an equilibrium if the cost functions are continuous in the second variable m.
Moreover, the equilibrium is unique under strict monotonicity conditions of the
cost function ci(x, u, .). Note that uniqueness in m does not mean uniqueness of
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Figure 5: Evolution of strategies of three agents over time. The imitative mean-
field learning converges to a global optimum.
the action profile u since one can permute some of the commuters. We use imi-
tative learning in an information-theoretic view point. We introduce the cost of
learning from strategy mi,t−1 to mi,t as the relative entropy dKL(mi,t−1,mi,t).
Then, each user reacts by taking a myopic conjecture given by
min
mi,t
〈cˆi,t,mi,t〉+ 1
βi,t
dKL(mi,t−1,mi,t)
where cˆi,t is the estimated cost vector, βi,t is a positive parameter, dKL is the
relative entropy from mi,t−1 to mi,t.
dKL is not a distance (because it is not symmetric) but it is positive and can
be seen as a cost to move from mi,t−1 to mi,t. We use the convexity property
of the relative entropy to compute the strategy that minimizes the perturbed
expected cost.
Proposition 1. Let βi,t = log(1 + νi,t) for νi,t > 0. Then, the imitative
Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy is the minimizer of the above problem which be-
comes a multiplicative weighted imitative strategy:
mi,t(u) :=
mi,t−1(u)(1 + νi,t)−cˆi,t−1(u)∑
u′∈Rmi,t−1(u′)(1 + νi,t)−cˆi,t−1(u
′) .
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Figure 6: The imitative mean-field learning converges to a global optimum.
The advantage of the imitative strategy is that it makes sense not only
in small learning rate but also in high learning rate. When the learning rate
is large, the trajectory gets closer to the best reply dynamics and for small
learning it leads to the replicator dynamics [139]. One useful interpretation of
the imitative strategy is the following: Consider a bounded rationality setup
where the parameter νi,t is the rationality level of user i. Then, a large value
of νi,t means a very high rationality level for user i, hence user i will use an
almost “best reply” strategy. Small value of νi,t means that user i is of a low
rationality level and is described by the replicator equation. It is interesting
to see that both behaviors can be captured by the same imitative mean-field
learning. Note that the logit (or Boltzmann-Gibbs) learning does not cover the
low rationality level case.
Proposition 2. As νi,t goes to zero, the trajectory of the multiplicative weighted
imitative strategy is approximated by the replicator equation of the estimated
delays
m˙i,t(u) = mi,t(u)
[
−cˆi,t(u) +
∑
u′
mi,t(u
′)cˆi,t(u′)
]
.
For one commuter case, the solution of the replicator equation yields
mi,t(u) =
mi,0(u)e
−t. 1t
∫ t
0
cˆi,t′ (u) dt
′∑
u′ mi,0(u
′)e−t.
1
t
∫ t
0
cˆi,t′ (u′) dt′
The solution is
mi,t(u) =
mi,0(u)e
−tc¯i(u)∑
u′ mi,0(u
′)e−tc¯i(u′)
.
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Clearly the time-average trajectory based on average payoff and smooth
best reply dynamics are closely related with parameter βi,t = t. Each driver
knows the current state and employs the learning pattern. Each driver tries to
exploit the information on the current state and build a strategy based on the
observation of the vector of realized delays over all the routes at the previous
steps. Then the Folk theorem for evolutionary game dynamics states:
• When starting from an interior mixed strategy, the replicator equation
converges to one of the equilibria.
• All the faces of the multi-simplex are forward invariant. In particular, the
pure strategies are steady states of the imitative dynamics.
• The set of global optima belongs to the set of steady states of the imitative
dynamics.
The strategy-learning of user i is given by
L1i (xt) : mi,t(xt, u) := mi,t−1(xt, u)(1 + νi,t)
−ci,t−1(xt,u)∑
u′∈Rmi,t−1(xt, u
′)(1 + νi,t)−ci,t−1(xt,u
′) (9)
L2i (xt) : mi,t(xt, u) := mi,t−1(xt, u)(1 + νi,t)
−c¯i,t−1(xt,u)∑
u′ mi,t−1(xt, u
′)(1 + νi,t)−c¯i,t−1(xt,u
′) , (10)
where c¯i,t(x, u) is the time-average delay (up to t) in route u and state x.
The imitative mean-field learning above can be used to solve a long-term
mean-field game problem. We observe in Figures 5- 6 that the imitative learning
converges to one of the global optima. However, the exploration space grows in
complexity. We explain how to overcome to this issue using mean-field learning
based on particle swarm optimization (PSO). In it each user has a population of
particles (multi-swarm). The particles within the same population (coalition)
may pool their effort to learn faster and exploit better the available information.
The next example concerns multi-level building evacuation [140, 141, 142,
143] using constrained mean-field games.
Application 2 (Multi-level building evacuation). A typical mean-field game
model assumes that agents have unconstrained state dynamics. This has been,
for example, the case with most of the existing mean-field models developed in
the last three decades. Such models may not however be useful in practice, for
example in a context of building evacuation. Evacuation strategies and values
are designed using constrained mean-field-type game theory.
Particle-based pedestrian models have been studied in [144, 145]. Continuum
approximation of theoretical models have been proposed in [146, 144, 147, 145,
148, 149]. Recent mean-field studies on crowd and pedestrian flows include
[150, 151, 152, 153, 154]. Below a mean-field game for multi-level building
evacuation is presented. Consider a building with multiple floors and resolutions
represented by a compact domain D in the m−dimensional Euclidean space Rm.
The number of floors is K. The domain at floor k is denoted as Dk. For 1 <
k < K, the floor k is connected to the higher floor k+ 1 using the intermediary
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Figure 7: Spatial distribution of agents at time t = 5. Agents are represented
by small circles in the map. Agent in the higher floors will be evacuated using
the stair (blue rectangle) on floor 2. There is one exit door in the ground floor.
The exit door is in green-color code in the ground floor. Each agent chooses the
shortest and less congested path and decreases its velocity according to its own
congestion measure.
domain I+k but also the lower floor k − 1 using I−k . The sets Ik can be elevator
zones or stairs. n ≥ 2 agents are distributed in a multi-level multi-resolution
building with stairs, exit doors, sky-bridges. Each agent knows her current
location in the building. The state/location xi of an agent i changes depending
on her control action ui. The agent is interested in a safe evacuation from the
building. This means that she is interested in the minimal exit time that avoid
huge crowd around her. The problem of the agent i is equivalent to
infui c3(xi(T ), Gn(xi(T ))) +
∫ T
0
c1(Gn(xi(t)))‖ui(t)‖2 + c2(Gn(xi(t))) dt,
x˙i = ui ∈ R3, 0 < t < T
xi(t) ∈ D ⊂ R3,
Boundary constraints:
ui| ∂D = 0, ui| ExitDoor = k 6= 0 ∈ R3
where ci is a positive increasing function, with c2(0) = 0. T > 0 is the exit time
at one of the exits. The final exit cost is represented by c3 which can be written
as c˜3 + h˜(x) where c˜3 > 0 captures the initial response time of an agent (without
congestion around),
Gn(xi(t)) =
1
vol(B(xi(t), ))
∑
j 6=i 1l{d(xj(t),xi(t))≤}
n− 1 ,
represents the number of the agents around the position xi except i within
a distance less than  > 0, vol(B) is the m-dimensional volume of the ball
B(xi(t), ) which does not depend on xi(t), due to translation invariance of
the volume measure. When the number of agents grows, one obtains a mean-
field game with several interacting agents. The state dynamics must satisfy
the constraint xi(t) ∈ D at any time t before the exit. The non-optimized
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Hamiltonian in macroscopic setting as
H0(x, u,G, p) = −c1(G(x))‖u‖2 − c2(G(x)) + p.u,
where p is the adjoint variable. The Pontryagin maximum principle yields
p˙ = −H0x,
p(T ) = −gx(x(T )),
x˙ = p2c1(G(x)) , 0 < t ≤ T
x(0) ∈ D.
The Hamiltonian H0(., ., G, p(t)) is concave in (x, u) for almost everywhere
(a.e.) t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, for convex function c3, u∗ is an optimal response if
H0(x∗(t), u∗, G∗, p∗(t)) = maxuH0(x∗(t), u,G∗, p∗(t)). The (optimized) Hamil-
tonian as
H(x, p,G) = sup
u
{−c1(G(x))‖u‖2 − c2(G(x)) + pu}.
The Hamiltonian can be computed as H(x, p,G) = ‖p‖
2
4c1(G(x))
−c2(G(x)), and the
optimal strategy is in (own)state-and-mean-field feedback form: u∗ = p2c1(G(x)) =
Hp(x, p,G(x)), to be projected to the tangent space. The dynamic programming
principle leads to the following optimality system:
vt +H(x, vx, G(x)) = 0, on (0, T )×D
v(T, x) = −g(x), on D
ρt + divx(ρHp) = 0, ρ0(.) on D ⊂ R3
u = 0, y = 0 on ∂D
u = k, at exits
The development of numerical result, simulation and a validation framework
can be found in [140, 141, 142, 143]. Figures 7 and 8 show the application to a
two floors building where 500 agents are spatially distributed.
Next, two applications of MFTGs in electrical engineering are presented.
3.2 Electrical Engineering
Application 3 (Millimeter Wave Wireless Communication). Millimeter wave
(mmWave) frequencies, roughly between 30 and 300 GHz, offer a new fron-
tier for wireless networks. The vast available bandwidths in these frequencies
combined with large numbers of spatial degrees of freedom offer the potential
for orders of magnitude increases in capacity relative to current networks and
have thus attracted considerable attention for next generation 5G communica-
tion systems. However, sharing of the spectrum and the available infrastructure
will be essential for fully achieving the potential of these bands. Unfortunately,
rapidly changing network dynamics make it difficult to optimize resource shar-
ing mechanisms for mmWave networks. MIMO mmWave wireless networks will
rely extensively on highly directional transmissions, where both users, relays
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and base stations transmit in narrow, high-gain beams through electronically
steerable antennas. While directional transmissions can improve signal range
and provide greater degrees of freedom through spatial multiplexing, they also
significantly complicate spectrum sharing. Nodes that share the spectrum must
not only detect one another, but also search over a potentially large angular
space to properly steer the beams and reduce interference. Power allocation,
angle optimization and channel selection algorithms should consider the possi-
ble interference field and reduce it by adjusting the angles. This can facilitate
rapid directional discovery in a dynamic and mobile environment as in Figure 9.
Sometimes jammers and malicious are involved in the interactions. Beams ad-
justment and Interference coordination are central problem for users within the
same network, or between users in different networks sharing the same spec-
trum. When multiple operators own separate core network and radio access
network (RAN) nodes such as base stations and relays, but only loosely co-
ordinate via wireless signaling, it is essential to use incentive mechanisms for
better coordination to exploit the available resources. Cost sharing and pricing
mechanisms capture some of the fundamental properties that arise when shar-
ing resources among multiple operators. It can also be used in the uplink case,
where users can select their preferred services and network provides and have
to find tradeoffs between quality-of-experience (QoE) and cost (price).
As an illustrative example, a particle swarm learning mechanism, which is
mean-field dynamics, in which the particles adapt the parameters such as angle
and power is used to improve users’ quality-of-experience. Here the key mean-
field terms are the distributions of remaining energy, distribution of transmitter-
receiver pairs and the sectorized interference field (per angle). Since users are
carrying smartphones with limited power consumption, it is crucial to examine
the remaining energy level. As in [91] the energy dynamic can be written as
de = −udt+ vdt+ σdW,
subject to e(t) ≥ 0, e(0) = e0, and u(.) ≥ 0 is the transmission power and v(.)
is the energy harvesting rate (for example, with distributed renewable energy
sources).
Proposition 3. The marginal distribution me(t, e) of remaining energy solves
the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation:
∂tm
e + ∂e[(−u+ v)me]− σ
2
2
∂eem
e = 0,
in a distribution sense. The first moment dynamics yields ddt e¯ = −u¯+ v¯, where
e¯(t) = E[e(t)], u¯(t) = E[u(t)], v¯(t) = E[v(t)] denotes the expected value of e(t),
u(t), v(t) respectively.
Users move according to a mobility dynamics (which may not be stationary).
The channel state can be modeled, for example using a matrix valued Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process dHj = Γj [Hˆj −Hj ]dt+ dWj where Γj , Hˆj are matrices with
compatible dimensions of antennas at source and destination.
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Proposition 4. The marginal distribution mHj (t,Hj) of channel state of user
j solves the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation:
∂tm
Hj + divHj [(Γj(Hˆj −Hj))mHj ]−
1
2
trace[∂HjHjm
Hj ] = 0,
in a weak sense. The first moment dynamics of user j yields
d
dt
H¯j = Γj(Hˆj − H¯j),
which decays exponentially to Hˆj as t increases.
The (unnormalized) distribution of the triplet (position, energy, channel) of
the population at time (or period) t is ν(t, e, x,H) =
∑n
j=1 δ{ej(t),xj(t),Hj(t)},
and the one within a beam A(s, d) with direction s− d is
ν˜(t, e, x,H, s, d) =
n∑
j=1
δ{ej(t),xj(t),Hj(t)}1lxj(t)∈A(s,d).
The sectorized interference field is I(t, x(t), d) =
∫
(x¯,H¯,u¯)
φ(x¯−x(t), H¯, u¯))ν˜(t, E, x¯, H¯, x(t), d).
Compared to other wireless technologies, mmWave may generate less interfer-
ence because of reduced and optimized angles. However, interference may still
occur when several users and blocking objects fall within the same angle as de-
picted in Figure 9. The success probability P(SINRi ≥ βi) from position xi(t)
to destination di for both LoS and non-LoS can then be derived. The quality-
of-experience of users can be termed as function of the sectorized interference
field, satisfaction level and user-centric subjective measures such as MOS (mean
opinion score) values.
Application 4 (Distributed Power Networks (DIPONET)). Distributed power
is a power generated at or near the point of use. This includes technolo-
gies that supply both electric power and mechanical power. The rise of dis-
tributed power is also being driven by the ability of distributed power sys-
tems to overcome the energy need constraints, and transmission and distribu-
tion lines. Mean-field game theoretic applications to power grid can be found
in [113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 93, 121, 122, 123, 124]. A pro-
sumer (producer-consumer) is a user that not only consumes electricity, but
can also produce and store electricity. Based on forecasted demand, each
operator determines its production quantity, its mismatch cost, and engages
an auction mechanism to the prosumer market. The performance index is
Lj(sj , ej) = ljT (e(T )) +
∫ T
0
lj(Dj(t) − Sj(t)) + ρ2
∑
k s
2
jk(t) dt. Each producer
aims to find the optimal production strategies:
infsj ,ej Lj(sj , ej , T )
d
dtejk(t) = cjk(t)− sjk(t)
cjk(t) ≥ 0, sjk(t) ∈ [0, s¯jk], ∀j, k, t
sjk(w) = 0 if w is a starting time of a maintenance period.
ej,k(0) given.
22
where Dj(t) is a demand at time t, lj(Dj(t)−S(t)) denotes the instant loss where
S(t) = Sproducer(t)+Sprosumer(t), Sproducer(t) =
∑n
j=1 sj(t) =
∑n
j=1
∑Kj
k=1 sj,k(t) ,
where sj,k(t) is the production rate of plant/generator k of j at time t. Kj total
number of power plants of j. The loss lj is assumed to be strictly convex. The
stock of energy at time t is given by the classical motion ddtejk where cjk(t) is the
maintenance cost of plant/generator k of j when it is in the maintenance phase.
The optimality equation of the problem is given by Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman:{
∂tvj(t, ej) +Hj(Dj(t), ∂ejvj(t, ej)) = 0, t < T
vj(T, ej) = ljT (ej),
(11)
where Hj is the Hamiltonian function is
Hj(Dj , yj) = inf
sj
[lj(Dj − Sj) + ρ
2
∑
k
s2jk +
∑
k
(cjk − sjk)yjk] (12)
The first order interior optimality condition yields −l′j(Dj−Sj)−yjk+ρsjk = 0.
By summing over k one gets an equation for the total production quantity S∗j
solves −Kj l′j(Dj−Sj)−
∑Kj
k=1 yjk+ρSj = 0. The optimal supply of power plant
k is s∗jk = min(s¯jk,
l′j(Dj−S∗j )+yjk
ρ ). The solution of partial differential equation
(11) can be explicitly obtained and it is given by the Hopf-Lax formula:
vj(t, ej) = inf
y∈RKj
{
ljT (y) + (T − t)H∗j
(
Dj ,
ej − y
T − t
)}
, (13)
where H∗j is the Legendre transformation of Hj , and is given by
H∗j (Dj , a) = lj
(
Dj − 1
ρ
∑
k
ajk −
l′j(Dj − S∗j )
ρ
)
+
ρ
2
∑
k
a2jk +
∑
k
cjkajk.
Note that (13) provides an explicit solution to the Demand-Supply matching
problem between power plants of prosumer j and this holds for arbitrary number
of prosumers and power stations.
The mean-field equilibrium is obtained as fixed-point equation involving S∗
and D∗. When l′j is continuous and preserves the production domain [0, s¯] one
can guarantee the existence of such a solution by using Brouwer fixed-point the-
orem. One can use higher order fast mean-field learning to learn and compute of
such a mean-field equilibrium. Figure 10 illustrates the optimal supply based on
an estimated demand curve. Figure 11 represents an allocation of the producer
with two power stations.
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3.3 Computer Engineering
This section provides applications of MFTG in computer engineering. It starts
with an application of MFTG with number finite state-actions and then focuses
on continuous state-action spaces.
Application 5 (Virus Spread over Networks). We study a malware propagation
over computer networks where the nodes interact through network-based oppor-
tunistic meetings (see Figure 12 and Table 4). The security level of network is
measured as a function of some key control parameters: acceptance/rejection of
a meeting, opening/not opening a suspicious e-mail, file or packet. We model
the propagation of the virus in network as a sort of epidemic process on a ran-
dom graph of opportunistic connections [155]. A computer/node can randomly
get online an infected or non infected data from other computers.
An infected computer can be in two states: dormant or fully infected. The
non-infected computers are susceptible to be approached by virus coming from
infected ones. The possible states are therefore denoted as Dormant (D), In-
fected/Corrupt(C) and Susceptible/Honest (H). The set of types is 1 or 2, also
denoted generically as θ, θ′. For each type the state may be different except for
honest state where it is considered as honest in both regimes of the network.
The network size is n ≥ 1. The repartition of the nodes at time step t is denoted
as n = Dθ(t) +Dθ′(t) + Cθ(t) + Cθ′(t) +H(t).
The frequency of the states θ is called occupancy measure of the population
and is denoted as Mn(t) = (Dθ(t)/n,Dθ′(t)/n,Cθ(t)/n,Cθ′(t)/n,H(t)/n) =:
(Dnθ (t), D
n
θ′(t), C
n
θ (t), C
n
θ′(t), H
n(t)). Mn(.) is a random process and its limit
measure corresponds to the mean field term. The goal is understand the impact
of the control action on combatting virus spread, which is the minimization of
proportion On(t) := 1−Hn(t)). The interaction is simulated using the following
rules:
Changes from Dormant states: A node in dormant state (transient) with
type θ may become honest with probability δD ∈ (0, 1). A dormant with type
θ may opportunistically meet another dormant of type θ′, and both become
active. This occurs with probability proportional to the frequency of other
dormant agent at time t. For type θ, the probability is λ(Dnθ′(t) − 1n1l{θ=θ′}).
Note that the dormant can decide to contact the other dormant or not, so there
are two possible actions: {m, m¯} (to meet or not to meet). Those events will be
modeled with a Bernoulli random variable with success (meeting) probability
δm, which represents u(m|D, θ).
Changes from Corrupt States: A corrupt node may become honest with
probability δC . A corrupt node of type θ may become dormant with probability
β
Dnθ (t)
qθ+Dnθ (t)
at time t. Here is assumed that, at high concentrations of dormants,
each corrupt node infects at most a certain maximum number of dormant nodes
per time step. This reflects the fact a corrupt has a limitation in terms its power,
domination and capabilities. The parameter 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 can be interpreted as a
maximum contamination rate. The parameter 0 ≤ qθ ≤ 1 is the dormant node
density at which the infection spread proceeds.
Changes from Susceptible/Honest states: An honest node may become
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infected with probability δH + (1 − δH)Cn(t). An honest node may become
dormant via two ways. First, δSm is the probability of getting corrupt by the
network representative node. In this case, the honest node can decide share
or not, so there are two possible actions: {o, o¯}. This case will be modeled
using a coin toss with probability δe ∈ (0, 1). Second, η(Dnθ (t) +Dnθ′(t)) models
the probability of meeting a dormant node. Here η ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the
dormant node can decide to contact the honest node or not, and it is modeled
analogously to the other two cases.
The payoff function is the opposite of the infection level. Each transition
described above has a certain contribution to be infection level of the society,
which could be 0 if no corrupt or dormant node become honest, −1/n if there
is a node which become honest and +1/n if one node is corrupt (D or C). In
Table 4 are the transition probabilities, the contribution to Mn(t+ 1)−Mn(t),
the set of actions, and the contribution to information spread in the network.
Table 4: Probabilities, effects (D,C,H), actions and loss function.
Case Transition proba. (θ, θ′ ∈ {1, 2}). Mnθ (t+ 1)−Mnθ (t) Actions Propagation
D
δD−−→ H Dnθ (t)δD (−1, 0, 1)/n singleton set −1/n
2D
λ−→ 2C Dnθ (t)δ2mλ(Dnθ (t)− 1n ) (−2, 2, 0)/n {m, m¯} 0
C
δC−−→ H Cnθ (t)δC (0,−1, 1)/n singleton set −1/n
C
β
qθ+D
n
θ
(t)−−−−−−→ D Cnθ (t)β D
n
θ (t)
qθ+Dnθ (t)
(−1, 1, 0)/n singleton set 0
H
δH+(1−δH)Cn−−−−−−−−−−→ C Hn(t)[δH + (1− δH)Cn(t)] (0, 1,−1)/n singleton set 1/n
H
η−→ D Hn(t)(δeδSm + δmηDn(t)) (1, 0,−1)/n {o, o¯,m, m¯} 1/n
The drift, that is, the expected change of Mn in one time step, given the
current state of the system is fn(m) = nE(Mn(t + 1) −Mn(t)|Mn(t) = m)
which can be expressed as:
fn(m) =

−dθδD −2dθδ2mλndθ−1n −cθβ dθqθ+dθ +h(δeδSm+δmηd)
−dθ′δD −2dθ′δ2mλndθ′−1n −cθ′β dθ′qθ′+dθ′ +h(δeδSm+δmηd)
2dθδ
2
mλ
ndθ−1
n − cθδC + cθβ dθqθ+dθ + h(δH + (1− δH)c)
2dθ′δ
2
mλ
ndθ′−1
n − cθ′δC + cθ′β dθ′qθ′+dθ′ + h(δH + (1− δH)c)
dδD+cδC−2h(δH + (1− δH)c)−2h(δeδSm+δmηd)

where m = (dθ, dθ′ , cθ, cθ′ , h) , d = dθ+dθ′ and c = cθ+cθ′ . Then the limit of
fn(m) is
f(m) =

−dθδD −2λd2θδ2m −cθβ dθqθ+dθ +h(δeδSm+δmηd)
−dθ′δD −2λd2θ′δ2m −cθ′β dθ′qθ′+dθ′ +h(δeδSm+δmηd)
2λd2θδ
2
m − cθδC + cθβ dθqθ+dθ + h(δH + (1− δH)c)
2λd2θ′δ
2
m − cθ′δC + cθ′β dθ′qθ′+dθ′ + h(δH + (1− δH)c)
dδD+cδC−2h(δH + (1− δH)c)−2h(δeδSm+δmηd)

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Notice that the sum of the all the components of f(m) is zero. Furthermore,
if one of the components mj of m = (dθ, dθ′ , cθ, cθ′ , h) is zero then the corre-
sponding drift function fj(m) ≥ 0. As a consequence, in the absence of birth
and death process, the 4−dimensional simplex is forward invariant, meaning
that if initially m(0) is in the simplex, then for any time greater than 0 the
trajectory of m(t) stays in the simplex domain.
3.3.1 Centralized control design
We minimize the proportion of node with states C or D by means of controlling
u(.|), i.e., by adjusting (δm, δe) ∈ [0, 1]2. Since o(t) = c1 +c2 +d1 +d2 = 1−h(t),
minimizing o(t) is equivalent to maximize the proportion of susceptible node in
the population. Therefore the optimization problem becomes sup δe,δm h(T ) +
∫ T
0
h(t) dt
m˙ = f(m), m(0) = m0
where, m = (c1, c2, d1, d2, h).
Hˆ = h + f1p1 + f2p2 + f3p3 + f4p4 + f5p5. This is a twice continuously
differentiable function inm, and ∂mj Hˆ =
∑5
i=1[∂mjfi]pi for j ≤ 4. The optimum
control strategies at time t are the ones that maximize Hˆ.
arg max δe,δm Hˆ
m˙ = f(m), m(0) = m0
p˙j = −
∑5
i=1[∂mjfi]pi, j ≤ 4, t < T
p˙5 = −1−
∑5
i=1[∂hfi]pi, t < T
p(T ) = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1].
3.3.2 Combatting Virus Propagation by Means of Individual Action
Let S(t) be the random variable describing the individual state at time t of a
generic individual and assume that a generic individual is in a state s at time
t. Then S(t+ 1n ) is independent of previous values (S(t
′) : t′ ≤ t) and as n goes
to infinity for all state s′. The reward of a generic individual payoff is defined as
follows: pθ(s, u,m) = 0 if the individual state s is different than H, and equals 1
if the state s = H. By doing so, each individual tries to adjust its own trajectory.
People in honest state will accept less meeting and will set their meeting rate δm
to be minimal, and the other individual with state different than H will try to
enter to H as soon as possible. As in a classical communicating Markov chain,
this is the entry time to state H.
Figure 13 reports the result of the simulation with the following 3 starting
points: (d, c) = (0.2, 0.6), (d, c) = (1/3, 1/3) and (d, c) = (0.2, 0). In the three
cases, the system converges to the same steady state which is around (d, c) =
(0.38, 0.6). Figure 14 plots the reward (honest people) as a function of time for
two different control parameters δm = 0.9 and δm = 0.1. We observe that the
reward is greater for δm = 0.1 than the one for δm = 0.9.
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3.3.3 Network effect
The primary advantage of network models is their ability to capture complex
individual-level structure in a simple framework. To specify all the connections
within a network, we can form a matrix from all the interaction strengths which
we expect to be sparse with the majority of values being zero. Usually, for
simplicity, two individuals (or populations) are either assumed to be connected
with a fixed interaction strength or unconnected. In such cases, the network of
contacts is specified by a graph matrix G, where Gij is 1 if individuals i and
j are connected, or 0 otherwise. A connection could be a relationship between
the two nodes. It may be represent an internet, social network or physical
connection. They may not be close in terms of location. The status of an node
will be influenced by the status of its connection following the rules specified
above. The resulting graph-based mean-field dynamics is illustrated in Figure
15.
Application 6 (Cloud Networks). Resource sharing solutions are very impor-
tant for data centers as it is required and implemented at different layers of
cloud networks [95, 96, 97]. The resource sharing problem can be formulated
as a strategic decision-making problem. Lot of resources may be wasted if the
cloud user consider an economic renting. Therefore a careful system design is
required when a several clients interact. Price design can significantly improve
the resource usage efficiency of large cloud networks. We denote such a game by
Gn, where n is the number of clients. The action space of every user is U = R+
which is a convex set, i.e., each user i chooses an action ui that belongs to
the set U . An action may represent a certain demand. All the actions together
determine an outcome. Let pn be the unit price of cloud resource usage by the
clients. Then, the payoff of user j is given by
ri(x, u1, . . . , un) = cn(x)
h(ui)∑n
j=1 h(uj)
− pn(x)ui, (14)
if
∑n
j=1 h(uj) > 0 and zero otherwise. The structure of the payoff function
ri(x, u1, . . . , un) for user i shows that it is a percentage of allocated capacity
minus the cost for using that capacity. Here, cn(x) represents the value of the
available resources, h is a positive and nondecreasing function with h(0) = 0.
We fix the function h to be xα where α > 0 denotes a certain return index. x is
the state of cloud networks which is a random variable on the availability of the
servers. The cloud game Gn is given by the collection (X ,N ,U , (ri)i∈I) where
I = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, is the number of potential users. The next Proposition
provides closed-form expression of the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game
Gn for a fixed state x such that cn(x) > 0, pn(x) > 0, and for some range of
parameter α. It also provides the optimal price p∗n such that no resource is
wasted in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. By direct computation, the following results:
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(1) The resource sharing game Gn is a symmetric game. All the clients have
symmetric strategies in equilibrium whenever it exists.
(2) For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and x ∈ X , the payoff ri is concave (outside the origin) with
respect to own-action ui. The best response BRi(u−i) is strictly positive
and is given by the root of
z(α−1)/2(
αcn(x)
npn(x)
G)1/2 − z
α
n
−G = 0, G , 1
n
∑
j 6=i
uαj
where z , ui and there is a unique equilibrium (hence a symmetric one)
given by
(
zα−1 αcn(x)npn(x)
n−1
n z
α
) 1
2 − zαn − n−1n zα = 0, i.e.,
u∗NE(x) = α
(n− 1)cn(x)
n2pn(x)
.
It follows that the total demand na∗NE(x) at equilibrium is less than
cn(x)
pn(x)
which means that some resources are wasted.
The equilibrium payoff is ri(x, a
∗
NE) = uipn(x)
[
G+
uαi
n
αG − 1
]
which is pos-
itive for α ≤ 1.
(3) For α > 1, the activity (participation) of user i depends mainly of the
aggregate of the others. u∗i > 0 only if G ≤ G∗ and the number of active
clients should be less than αα−1 . If n >
α
α−1 then BRi = 0.
(4) With a participation constraint, the payoff at equilibrium (whenever it
exists) is at least 0.
(5) By choosing the price p∗n = α
(n−1)
n < α one gets that the total demand
at equilibrium is exactly the available capacity of the cloud. Thus, pricing
design can improve resource sharing efficiency in the cloud. Interestingly,
as n grows, the optimal pricing converges to α.
We say that the cloud renting game is efficient if no resource is wasted, i.e.,
the equilibrium demand is exactly cn(x). Hence, the efficiency ratio is
na∗NE
cn(x)
. As
we can see from (ii) of Proposition 5, the efficiency ratio goes to 1 by setting
the price to p∗n. This type of efficiency loss is due to selfishness and have been
widely used in the literature of mechanism design and auction theory. Note
that the equilibrium demand increases with α, decreases with the charged price
and increases with the capacity per user. The equilibrium payoff is positive and
if α ≤ 1 each user will participate in an equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium
the optimal pricing p∗n depends on the number of active clients in the cloud
and value of α. When the active number of clients varies (for example, due to
new entry or exit in the cloud), a new price needs to be setup which is not
convenient.
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3.4 Mechanical Engineering
Application 7 (Synchronization and Consensus). Consider a coupled oscillator
dynamics with a control parameter per agent.
dθi = [ωi +
n∑
j=1
Kij(θ) sin(θj − θi) + ui]dt+ σdWi(t),
where θi is the phase of oscillator i, ωi is the natural frequency of oscillator i, n
is the total number of oscillators in the system and K is a coupling interaction
term. The objective here is to explore phase transition and self organization
in large population dynamic systems. We explore the mean-field regime of the
dynamical mean-field systems and explain how consensus and collective motion
emerge from local interactions. These dynamics have interesting applications
in multi-robot coordination. Figure 16 presents a Kuramoto-based synchro-
nization scheme [156]. The uncontrolled Kuramoto model can lead to multiple
clusters of alignment. Using mean-field control law, one can drive the trajecto-
ries (phases) towards a consensus as illustrated in Figure 17 which represents
the behaviors for ui = −ωi + ηi sin
(
1
n
∑n
j=1 θj − θi
)
. This type of behavior is
useful in mobile robot rendezvous problems in which each agent needs to move
towards a common point (where the rendezvous will take place).
We now provide another relevant application of the Kuramoto model in
convoy protection scenario with mobile car-like robots. The goal of the robots
is to keep protecting the convoy by occupying the space as the convoy moves.
The mean-field-type control helps to balance between energy, placement error
and risk. The authors in [157] have shown that the Kuramoto model modified
with phase shift of pi2 radians can be used in convoy protection scenario given
in Figure 18. In this scenario, we want the agents to follow the movement of
the convoy while spreading out along a circular perimeter. The mean-field-
type control law allow the agents to be positioned equally on a circle and self-
organizing the distribution pattern once new agents are added into the network
for protecting the convoy and occupying the space. Note that re-configuration
of the multi-robot team will be done in a distributed way over the circle with
center c and with radius r. The protecting convoy is a rear-wheel drive, front-
wheel steerable car-like mobile robot. The car-like robot to be controlled is
given in Figure 19. The kinematic parameters of the mobile robot i are given
by (pi(t), vi(t), θi(t), βi(t), li) representing the cartesian coordinate (position)
pi(t) = (xi,1(t), xi,2(t)) of robot i located at the mid-point of the rear-wheel
axle, vi(t) is the translational driving speed, θi(t) is the orientation, βi(t) the
steering angle of the front wheels and li the distance between front and rear
wheel axle. The goal is to control the robot to a desired orbit while spreading
out. One can control the velocity vi through acceleration and the steering angle
βi. The evolution of center point c and the radius r are given by the drift function
bc(t), br(t). The connectivity in the circular graph for agent i is limited to two
other agents : i− 1 and i + 1 modulo n. Each agent i is influenced only by its
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neighboring agents. The instantaneous cost is
Li(t) = 1[cos(θi+1 − θi) + cos(θi − θi−1)] + 2(θi − pi
2
− tan−1(xi,1 − c1
xi,2 − c2 )).
The first term in bracket says that agent i should spread out from i−1, i+1. The
second in the bracket represents the orientation synchronization. The terminal
cost is of mean-field type and is given by
Li(T ) = 3
|vi|2
d(xi, c)r
+ 4|d(xi, c)− r|2 + 5var(vi),
representing a balance between the kinetic energy spent, the error adjustment
for being on the new circle and the variance respectively.
The finite horizon cost functional of agent i is Ji(u, β) = Li(T )+
∫ T
0
Li(t)dt.
Let C(c(0), r(0)) be the circle with center c(0) and radius r(0). The best-response
problem of agent i is
supui,βi −EJi(u, β)
x˙i,1 = vi cos θi,
x˙i,2 = vi sin θi,
dθi = vi
tanβi
li
dt+ σ tanβili dWi(t),
vi = d(xi, c)
r[ωi +
∑n
j=1Kij(θ) cos(θj − θi) + ui]
xi(0) ∈ C(c(0), r(0)) ⊂ R2
This is a mean-field-type optimization and the optimality system is easily de-
rived from the stochastic maximum principle.
Application 8 (Energy-Efficient Buildings). Nowadays a large amount of the
electricity consumed in buildings is wasted. A major reason for this wastage is
inefficiencies in the building technologies, particularly in operating the HVAC
(heating, ventilation and air conditioning) systems. These inefficiencies are in
turn caused by the manner in which HVAC systems are currently operated. The
temperature in each zone is controlled by a local controller, without regards to
the effect that other zones may have on it or the effect it may have on others.
Substantial improvement may be possible if inter-zone interactions are taken
into account in designing control laws for individual zones [125, 126, 127, 128,
129]. The room/zone temperature evolution is a controlled stochastic process
dTi = [1(Text − Ti) +
∑
j∈Ni
2ij(Tj − Ti) + 3ui(Tref − Ti)]dt+ σdWi,
where 1, 2ij , 3 are positive real numbers. The control action ui in room i
depends on the price of electricity p(demand, supply, location). The cost for
driving to the comfort temperature zone (see Figure 20) is (Ti − Ti,comfort)2 +
var(Ti − Ti,comfort). The payoff of consumer is a sort of tradeoff between com-
fort temperature and electricity cost uip. The instantaneous total cost of con-
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sumer i is
Li(t) = uip(.)︸ ︷︷ ︸
energy price
+
deviation to the comfort zone︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Ti − Ti,comfort)2 + var(Ti − Ti,comfort)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk
.
Within the time horizon [0, τ ], τ > 0, consumer i minimizes in ui :
var(Ti(τ)− Ti,comfort) + E
∫ τ
0
Li(t)dt.
However, the electricity price p(.) depends on the demandD =
∫
I
consumption(i)m1(t, di)
and supply S =
∫
J
supply(j)m2(t, dj). m1(t, .) is the population mean-field of
consumers, i.e., the consumer distribution at time t. Note that m1 is an unnor-
malized measure. m2 is the distribution of suppliers. The building is served by
a producer whose remaining energy dynamics is
dejk(t) = [cjk(t)1l{k∈Acj(t)} − sjk(t)]dt+ σdWjk,
The instant payoff of the producer j is its revenue minus the cost. The cost is
decomposed as the cost due to mismatch between supply and demand and the
production cost. The payoff is
rj = qjp(D,S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
−
mismatch cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
var(Dj − Sj)− c(qj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
.
Producer j solves maxqj E
∫ τ
0
rjdt subject to the production constraint above.
Explicit solutions to both problem can be obtained using the framework devel-
oped in [132, 134].
3.5 General Engineering
Application 9 ( Online Meeting). Group meeting online, even over video, is
much different than sitting in a boardroom communicating face-to-face with
someone. But they something in common: deciding to join Early or on Time
the group meeting. In the context of online video group meeting, since the
communication is over video, the opportunity for miscommunication is much
higher, and thus, one should pay close attention to how the group meeting
is conducted. Each group member aims to heighten the quality of her online
meetings by acting professionally and by signing early or on time: Nothing
throws off a meeting worse than scheduling woes. This is in particular widely
observed for online group meetings.
Scheduling and synchronization is probably the hardest job in these meet-
ings. The help scheduling groups from different sites can login to the meeting
space at their convenience makes it easier to get meetings started on time. How-
ever, it does not mean that the meeting will start exactly at scheduled time.
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The group members can decide to be at convenient place early and prepare for
the meeting to start, giving you time to settle down and get acquainted with
the interface. We examine how agents decide when to join the group meeting in
a basic setup. We consider several industry and academia aiming to collaborate
on a research development. The companies are located at different sites. Each
company from each site has appointed work package leader. In order to improve
savings from long business trips, hotels/ accommodation and to reduce jet-lags
effect the companies decided to organize an online meeting. After coordinating
all the members availability, date and time is found and the meeting is initially
scheduled to start at time t¯. Each member has the starting time in his schedule
and calendar remainders but in practice, the online meeting only begin when a
certain number n¯ of representative group leaders and group members will con-
nect online and will be seated in these respective rooms. Thus, the effective
starting time T of the online meeting is unknown and people organize their
behavior as a function of (t¯, n¯, T ).
Each group member can move from her office to the meeting room (see
Figure 21). The dynamics of agent i is simply given by x˙i = ui, where xi(0) ∈ D.
Let n(t) be the number of people arrived (and seated) in the room before t. If
the criterion is met (by all groups) before the initially scheduled time t¯ of the
meeting, this latter starts exactly at t¯. If on the other hand the criterion is
met at a later time, T is determined by the self-consistency relation: T =
inf{t | t ≥ t¯, n(t) ≥ n¯}. The instantaneous cost function is h(Gn(xi))‖ui‖2
and the terminal cost is c(th) = c1[th − t¯]+ + c2[th − T ]+ + c3[T − th]+ where
ci are non-negative real numbers, and th = inf{t, | xi(t) ∈ MeetingRoom}.
Let J(u) = c(th) +
∫ th
0
h(Gn(xi))‖ui‖2 dt where h(Gn(xi))‖ui‖2 quantifies a
congestion-dependent kinetic energy spent to reach the meeting room of her
group. [T − th]+ quantifies the useless waiting time, [th − T ]+ quantifies of
the time for missing of beginning of the online meeting,[th − t¯]+ quantifies the
sensitivity to her reputation of being late at the meeting. Given the strategies
(u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un), of the other agents, the best response problem of i
is:  supui −J(u)x˙i = ui, xi(0) ∈ D ⊂ R2
ui = 0 over ∂D ⊂ R2, ui = k at Exits ⊂ R2
Even if h(.) is constant, the agents interact because of a common term: the
starting time of the online meeting T, and n(T ) ≥ n¯. For this reason, the choice
of the other agents matters. The best response of agent i solves the Pontryagin
maximum principle
p˙i = 0, t < tih
x˙i = u
∗
i =
pi
2 ,
xi(0) ∈ Building ⊂ R3.
Hence, xi(t) = xi(0) + t
pi(th)
2 will at arrive at position xroom, at time th =
2xroom−xi(0)pi(th) Thus, the optimal payoff of agent i starting from x at time 0 is
−c(th) −
∫ th
0
‖p(th)‖2
4 dt = −c(th) − th ‖p(th)‖
2
4 . The optimal payoff of agent i
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starting from x at time t is −c(th) − (th − t)‖p(th)‖
2
4 which is maximized for
−c′(th) + ‖p(th)‖
2
4 = 0, i.e., ‖p(th)‖2 = 4c′(th) hence ‖p(th)‖ = 2
√
c′(th) =
‖vx(th, x(th))‖. Knowing that the following two functions: v˜1(x) = 〈x, p∗〉, with
‖p∗‖∗ = 1, and v˜2(x) = c2 ± ‖x − y‖, with x 6= y, solves the Eikonal equation,
‖v˜x‖ = 1, one deduces an explicit solution of the Bellman equation: vt− ‖vx‖
2
2 =
0, v(th, x) = −c(th).
Proposition 6. The tradeoff value to the meeting room starting from point x
at time t is v(t, x) = −2√c′(th)d(x(t), xroom)− 2(th − t)c′(th)− c(th).
The next application uses MFTG theoretic modelling for smart cities.
Application 10 (Mobile CrowdSensing). The origins of crowdsourcing goes
back at least to the nineteenth century and before [164, 165]. Joseph Henry,
the Smithsonian’s first secretary, used the new networked technology of his day,
the telegraph, to crowdsource weather reports from across the country, creating
the first national weather map of the U.S. in 1856. Henry’s successor, Spencer
Baird, recruited citizen scientists to collect and ship natural history specimens
to Washington, D.C. by the other revolutionary new technology of the day - the
railroad - thus forming the bulk of the Institution’s early scientific collections.
Today’s mobile devices and vehicles not only serve as the key computing and
communication device of choice, but it also comes with a rich set of embedded
sensors, such as an accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, GPS, ambient
light, dual microphone, proximity sensor, dual camera and many others. Col-
lectively, these sensors are enabling new applications across a wide variety of
domains, creating huge data and give rise to a new area of research called mobile
crowdsensing or mobile crowdsourcing [164, 165, 166]. Crowd sensing pertains
to the monitoring of large-scale phenomena that cannot be easily measured by
a single individual. For example, intelligent transportation systems may require
traffic congestion monitoring and air pollution level monitoring. These phenom-
ena can be measured accurately only when many individuals provide speed and
air quality information from their daily commutes, which are then aggregated
spatio-temporally to determine congestion and pollution levels in smart cities.
Such a collected data from the crowd can be seen (up to a certain level) as a
knowledge, which in turn, can be seen as a public good [167].
A great opportunity exists to fuse information from populations of privately-
held sensors to create useful sensing applications will be public good. On the
other hand, it is important to model, design, analyze and understand the behav-
ior of the users and their concerns such as privacy issues and resource consider-
ations limit access to such data streams. Two MFTGs where each user decides
its level of participation to the crowdsensing: (i) public good, (ii) information
sharing, are presented below.
The smartphones are battery-operated mobile devices and sensors suffer from
a limited battery lifetime. Hence, there is a need for solutions that will limit
the energy consumptions of such mobile Internet-connected objects. Such an
involvement is translated into a energy consumption cost.
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All the data collected from these devices combine both voluntary participa-
tor sensing and opportunistic sensing from operators. The data is received by a
network of cloud servers. For security and privacy concerns, several information
are filtered, anonymized, aggregated and distributions (or mean-field) are com-
puted. The model is a public good game with an extra reward for contributors.
When decision-makers are optimizing their payoffs, a dilemma arises because
individual and social benefits may not coincide. Since nobody can be excluded
from the use of a public good, a user may not have an incentive to contribute
to the public good. One way of solving the dilemma is to change the game by
adding a second stage in which reward (fair) can be given to the contributors
(non-free-riders).
The strategic form game with incomplete information denoted by G0, is
described as follows: A stochastic state of the environment is represented by x.
There are n0 potential participant to the mobile crowdsensing. The number n0
is arbitrary, and represent the number of users of the game G0. As we will see,
the important number is not n0 but the number of active users (the ones with
non-zero effort), who are contributing to the crowdsensing.
Each mobile user i equipped with sensing capabilities, can decide to invest
a certain level of involvement and effort ui ≥ 0. The action space of user i is
Ui = R+. As we will see the degree of participation will be limited so that the
action space can be included into a compact interval. The payoff of user i is
additive and has three components: a public good component G¯i(m − R¯(x)),
a resource sharing component R¯(x) hi(ui)∑n0
j=1 hj(uj)
and a cost component p(x, ui).
Putting together, the function payoff is
r0i(x, u) = [G¯i(m− R¯(x))−p(x, ui)]1lm≥R¯(x) + R¯(x)
hi(ui)∑n0
j=1 hj(uj)
1l∑n0
j=1 hj(uj) 6=0.
where m =
∑n0
j=1 uj is the total contribution of all the users, where 1lB(x)
is the indicator function which is equal to 1 if x belongs to the set B and 0
otherwise. This creates a discontinuous payoff function. The function G¯i is a
smooth and nondecreasing, R(x) is a random non-negative number driven by
x. The discontinuity of the payoffs due the two branches {u : m ≥ R¯(x)} and
{u : m < R¯(x)} can be handled easily by eliminating the fact that the actions
in {u : m ≤ R¯(x)} cannot be equilibrium candidates.
Using standard concavity assumption with the respect to own-effort, one can
guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze the
equilibrium for G¯i(z) = aiz
α, hi(z) == z where ai ≥ 0, and α ∈ (0, 1]. For any
reward
R¯(x) ≥ 4m
∗σ
(1− σ)2 , σ =
G¯′i(m)− 1
G¯′j(m)− 1
> 0
where m∗ ∈ arg max[G¯(m) − m], there exists a design parameter (ai)i such
that the ”new” lottery based scheme provides the global optimum level of con-
tribution in the public good. We collect mobile crowdsensing users to form a
network in which secondary users who willing to share their throughput for the
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benefit of the society or their friends and friends’ of friends. This can be seen as
a virtual Multiple-Inputs-Multiple-Outputs (MIMO) system with several cells,
multiple users per cell, multiple antennas at the transmitters, multiple antennas
at the receivers. The virtual MIMO system is a sharing network represented
by a graph (V,E), where V is the set of users representing the vertices of the
social graph and E is the set of edges. To an active connection (i, j) ∈ E is
associated a certain value ij ≥ 0. The term ij is strictly positive if j belongs
to the altruistic outgoing network of i and i is concerned about the throughput
of user j. The first-order outgoing neighborhood of i (excluding i) is Ni,−. Sim-
ilarly, if i is receiving a certain portion from j then i ∈ Nj,− and ji > 0. In
the virtual MIMO system, each user i gets a potential initial throughput Thpi,t
during the slot/frame t and can decide to share/rent some portion of it to its
altruism subnetwork members in Ni,−. User i makes a sharing decision vector
ui,t = (uij,t)j∈Ni , where uij,t ≥ 0. The ex-post throughput is therefore
Thpi,t+ = Thpi,t +
∑
j | i∈Nj,−
uji,t −
∑
j∈Ni,−
uij,t.
Denote {j | i ∈ Nj,−} =: Ni,+. Then,
Thpi,t+ = Thpi,t +
∑
j∈Ni,+
uji,t −
∑
j∈Ni,−
uij,t. (15)
Since we are dealing with sharing decisions, the mathematical expressions are
not necessarily needed if the output can be observed or measured. Given a mea-
sured throughput, A user can decide to share or not based its own needs/demands.
The term
∑
j∈Ni,+ uji,t represents the total extra throughput coming to user i
from the other users in Ni,+ (excluding i). The term
∑
j∈Ni,− uij,t represents
the total outgoing throughput from user i to the other users in Ni,− (excluding
i). In other word, user i has shared
∑
j∈Ni,− uij,t to the others. If j /∈ Ni,−
then uij,t = 0 and for all i, uii,t = 0. The balance equation is∑
i
Thpi,t+ =
∑
i
Thpi,t +
∑
i,j
uji,t −
∑
i,j
uij,t
=
∑
i
Thpi,t, (16)
i.e., the system total throughput ex-post sharing is equal to the system total
throughput ex-ante sharing. This means that the virtual MIMO throughput is
redistributed and sharing among the users through individual sharing decisions
s. Some users may care about the others because he may be in their situation
in other slot/day. For these (altruistic) users, the preferences are better cap-
tured by an altruism term in the payoff. We model it through a simple and
parameterized altruism payoff.
The payoff function of i at time t is represented by
r1i(x, ui,t, u−i,t) = rˆi(Thpi,t+) +
∑
j∈Ni
ij rˆj(Thpj,t+). (17)
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Here, ij ≥ 0 and represents a certain weight on how much i is helping j. The
matrix (ij) plays an important role in the sharing game under consideration
since it determines the social network and the altruistic relationship between
the users over the network. The throughput Thp depends implicitly the random
variable x. The static simultaneous act one-shot game problem over the network
(V,E) is given by the collection G1, = (V, (Rn1−1+ , r1i)i). The vector ui is in
Rn1+ , but the i-th component is uii = 0. Therefore the choice vector reduces to be
in Rn1−1+ . and is denoted by (ui,1, . . . , ui,i−1, 0, ui,i+1, . . . , ui,n1) . An equilibrium
of G1, in state w is a matrix s ∈ Rn
2
1
+ such that
ui ∈ Rn1+ , uii = 0,
r1i(x, ui, u−i) = max
u′i
r1i(x, u
′
i, u−i). (18)
We analyze the equilibria of G1,. Note that in practice the shared through-
put cannot be arbitrary; it has to be feasible.
The set of actions can be restricted to
Ui =
ui | uii = 0, uij ≥ 0, ∑
j
uij ≤ C
 ,
where ui = (ui,1, . . . , ui,i−1, 0, ui,i+1, . . . , ui,n), and C > 0 is large enough. For
example, C can be taken as the maximum system throughput
∑
j Thpj,0. This
way, the set of sharing actions Ui of user i is non-empty, convex and compact.
Assuming that the functions rˆi are strictly concave, non-decreasing and con-
tinuous, one obtains that the game G1, has at least one equilibrium (in pure
strategies).
As highlighted above, the set of actions can be made convex and compact.
Since rˆi are continuous and strictly convex, it turns out that, each payoff func-
tion ri is jointly continuous and is concave in the individual variable ui (which
is a vector) when fixing the other variables. We can apply the well-known fixed-
point results which give the existence of constrained Nash equilibria. As we
know that G1, has at least one equilibrium, the next step is to characterize
them.
If the matrix u is an equilibrium of G1, then the following implications hold:
uij > 0 =⇒ rˆ′i(Thpi,0+) = ij rˆ′j(Thpj,0+). (19)
The equilibria may not be unique depending on the network topology. This
is easily proved and it is due to the fact that one may have multiple ways to
redistribute depending on the network structure and several redistributions can
lead to the same sum Thpi,0 +
∑
j uji −
∑
j uij . Even if the game has a set of
equilibria, the equilibrium throughput and the equilibrium payoff turn out to be
uniquely determined. The set of equilibria has a special structure as it is non-
empty, convex and compact. The ex-post equilibrium throughput increases with
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the ex-ante throughput and stochastically dominates the initial distribution of
throughput of the entire network. For rˆi = − 1θ e−θThpi , θ > 0 let ij =  where
 > 0. Then, the fairness is improved in the network as  increases. The topology
of the network matters. The difference between the highest throughput and the
lowest throughput in the network is given by the geodesic distance (strength)
of the multi-hop connection.
4 Time Delayed States and Payoffs
This section presents MFTGs with time-delayed state dynamics. Delayed dy-
namical systems and delayed payoffs appear in many applications. They are
characteristic of past-dependence, i.e., their behavior at time t not only de-
pends on the situation at t, but also on their past history and or time delayed
state. Some of such situations can be described with controlled stochastic dif-
ferential delay equations. Networked systems suffer from intermittent, delayed,
and asynchronous communications and sensing. To accommodate such systems,
time delays need to be introduced.
Applications include
• Consensus and collective motion of Cucker-Smale [163] type with delayed
information states
dxi = vidt
dvi =
∫
(x¯,v¯)
a(‖x¯− xi‖2)(v¯ − vi)ρ(t− τi, dx¯dv¯) dt+ c
(∫
v¯
v¯ρ(t− τi,X , dv¯)
)
dt+ uidt+ σdWi,
where ρ(t, dxdv) is the distribution of states at time t.
• Delayed information processing, where the difference of the states x¯ −
xi influences the dynamics after some time delay τi. Examples include
Kuramoto-based oscillators [156]
dxi =
[
wi +
∫
ρ(t− τi, dx¯) sin(x¯− xi(t− τi)) + ui
]
dt+ σdWi,
used to describe synchronization.
• Delayed information transmission, where agent i compares its state to the
information coming from its neighbor j after some time delay τi. Informa-
tion transmission delays arise naturally in many dynamical processes on
networks.
dxi =
[
wi +
∫
ρ(t− τi, dx¯) sin(x¯− xi(t)) + ui
]
dt+ σdWi.
Delayed information transmission has direct applications in opinion dy-
namics and opinion formation on social graph:
dxi =
[∫
B(xi,i)
ρ(t− τi, dx¯)− xi + ui
]
dt+ σdWi,
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• The Air Conditioning control towards a comfort temperature is influenced
by integrated-state which represents the trend.
• Transmission and propagation delay affect the performance of both wire-
line and wireless networks both delayed information processing and de-
layed information transmission occur.
• In computer network security, the proportion of infected nodes at time t is
a function of the delayed state, the topological delay, and the proportion of
susceptible individuals and some time delay for the contamination period.
• In energy markets, there is an observed phenomenon for the dynamics of
the price, which comes with a delayed effect.
4.1 Time-delayed mean-field game
We consider a mean-field game where agents interact within the time frame T .
The best-response of a generic agent is
sup
u∈U
E [G(u,m1,m2)], subject to
dx = b(t, x, y, z, u,m1,m2, ω)dt
+σ(t, x, y, z, u,m1,m2, ω)dW
+
∫
Θ
γ(t, x, y, z, u,m1,m2, θ, ω)N˜(dt, dθ),
x(t) = x0(t), t ∈ [−τ, 0],
(20)
where τk > 0 represents a time delay, x = x(t) is the state at time t of a
generic agent, y = (x(t − τk))1≤k≤D, is a D−dimensional delayed state vector,
z(t) = (
∫ t
t−τ λ(ds)φl(t, s)x(s))l≤I is the integral state vector of the recent past
state over [t−τ, t]. This represents the trend of the state trajectory. The process
φl(t, s) is an Fs−adapted locally bounded process. λ is a positive and σ−finite
measure. m1 the average states of all the agents, m2 the average control actions
of all the agents, x0 is a initial deterministic function of state. W (t) = W (t, ω) be
a standard Brownian motion on T = [0, T ] defined on a given filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t∈T ).
Payoffs: G(u,m1,m2) = g1(T, x(T ),m1(T ), ω)+
∫
t∈T g0(t, x, y, z, u,m1,m2, ω) dt,
where the instantaneous payoff function is g0 : T ×X 3 ×U ×X ×U ×Ω→ R,
the terminal payoff function is g1 : X 2 × Ω→ R.
State dynamics: The drift coefficient function is b : T ×X 3×U×X×U×Ω→
R, the diffusion coefficient function is σ : T × X 3 × U ×X × U × Ω→ R.
Jump process: Let N be a Poisson random measure with Le´vy measure
µ(dθ), independent of B and the measure µ is a σ−finite measure over Θ.
N˜(dt, dθ) = N(dt, dθ)−µ(dθ)dt. The function γ : T ×X 3×U×X×U×Θ×Ω→
R. The filtration Ft is the one generated by the union of events from W or N
up time t.
The goal is to find or to characterize a best response strategy to mean-field
(m1,m2) : u
∗ ∈ arg maxu∈U G(u,m1,m2).
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Hypothesis H1: The functions b, σ, g are continuously differentiable with
the respect to (x,m). Moreover, b, σ, g and all their first derivatives with the
respect to (x, y, z,m) are continuous in (x,m, u) and bounded.
We explain below why the existing solution approaches cannot be used to
solve (20). First, the presence of y, z lead to a delayed integro-McKean-Vlasov
and the stochastic maximum principle developed in [36, 33, 34, 37, 171, 174] does
not apply. The dynamic programming principle for Markovian mean-field con-
trol cannot be directly used here because the state dynamics is non-Markovian
due to the past and time delayed states. Hence, a novel solution approach or
an extension is needed in order to solve (20). A chaos expansion methodology
can be developed as in [160] using generalized polynomial of Wick and Poisson
jump process. The idea is to develop a finite-dimensional optimality equation
for (20). In this respect, a stochastic maximum principle could be a good candi-
date solution approach. Under H1, for each control u ∈ U , m1 and m2 the state
dynamics admits a unique solution, x(t) := xu(t). The non-optimized Hamilto-
nian is H(t, x, y, z, u,m1,m2, p, q, r¯, ω) : T ×X 3×U ×X ×U ×R2×J ×Ω→ R
where r¯(.) ∈ J and J is the set of functions on Θ such that ∫
Θ
γr¯(t, θ)µ(t, dθ) is
finite. The Hamiltonian is H = g0 + bp+ σq +
∫
Θ
γr¯(t, θ)µ(dθ). The first-order
adjoint process (p, q, r¯) is time-advanced and determined by
dp = E[−Hx1lt≤T −
D∑
k=1
Hyk(t+ τk)1lt≤T−τk | Ft]dt
−
I∑
l=1
E[λ(dt)
∫ t+τ
t
φl(t, s)Hz1ls∈[0,T ]ds | Ft]
+qdW (t) +
∫
r¯(t, dθ)N˜(dt, dθ), (21)
p(T ) = g1,x(x(T ),m1(T )). (22)
We now discuss the existence and uniqueness of the first-order adjoint equa-
tion.
Proposition 7. Assume that the coefficients are L2, the first order adjoint (22)
has a unique solution such that
E
[∫ T
0
p2 + q2 +
∫
Θ
r¯2(t, θ)µ(dθ) dt
]
< +∞
Moreover, the solution (p, q, r¯) can be found backwardly as follows:
• Within the time frame (T − τ, T ), dp = E[−Hx | Ft]dt + qdW (t) +∫
Θ
r(t, dθ)N˜(dt, dθ) with p(T ).
• We fix p(T − τ) from the previous step and solve (21) on interval (T −
2τ, T − τ).
• We inductively construct a procedure to compute p(t) on t ∈ [T − kτ, T −
(k − 1)τ ], k ≤ Tτ ending with p(T − (k − 1)τ).
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Note that, if t ∈ [T−kτ, T−(k−1)τ ] then t+τ ∈ [T−(k−1)τ, T−(k−2)τ ] and
hence, (p(t+ τ), q(t+ τ), r¯(t+ τ, θ)) is known from the previous step. However,
p(t+ τ) may not be Ft−adapted. Therefore a conditional expectation with the
respect to the filtration Ft is used.
If U is a convex domain, we know that the second-order adjoint processes
of Peng’s type are not required, and if (x∗, u∗) is a best response to m1,m2
then there is a triplet of processes (p, q, r¯), that satisfy the first order adjoint
equation such that
H(t, x∗, y∗, z∗, u∗,m1,m2, p, q, r¯)
−H(t, x∗, y∗, z∗, u,m1,m2, p, q, r¯) ≥ 0, (23)
for all u ∈ U , almost every t and P−almost surely (a.s.). A necessary condition
for (interior) best response strategy is therefore E[Hu | Ft] = 0 whenever Hu
makes sense. A sufficient condition for optimality can be obtained, for example,
in the concave case: g1, H are concave in (x, y, z, u) for each t almost surely.
4.2 Time delays effect in the Prosumers’ Integration to
Power Networks
Let c1(t), c2(t) and c3(t, z) be given bounded adapted processes, with c1 as-
sumed to be deterministic and
∫
c23ν(dz) < +∞. Consider the energy dynamic
generated by a prosumer as
dei = (c1(t)ei(t− τ)−ui)dt+ c2(t)ei(t− τ)dW (t) + ei(t− τ)
∫
c3(t, θ)N˜(dt, dθ),
ei(t) = ei0(t)1l[−τ,0](t) where ei0 is deterministic and bounded function that
is given. The energy ui is consumed by i. Prosumer i has a (random) sat-
isfaction function s(t, ui, ω) which is σ(Wt′ , N(t
′), t′ ≤ t)−adapted for each
consumption strategy ui ≥ 0, the random function s is assumed to be contin-
uously differentiable and increasing with the respect to ui and its derivative
sui(t, ui, ω) is decreasing in ui. The function sui(t, ui, ω) vanishes as the con-
sumption ui grows without bound. Therefore, the maximum value of sui(t, ui, ω)
is achieved when ui = 0 and the maximum value is m¯(t, ω) := sui(t, 0, ω).
The infinimum value of sui(t, ui, ω) is 0. It follows that ui 7→ sui(t, ui, ω)
is a one-to-one mapping from R+ to (0, m¯(t, ω)]. In particular, the function
br : λ 7→ (sui(t, ., ω))−1[λ]1l(0,m¯(t,ω)](λ) is well-defined and is a measurable
function. Prosumer i aims to maximize her satisfaction functional together
with her profit E
[
g(ei(T )) +
∫ T
0
s(t, ui, ω) + price(m)qi dt
]
The Hamiltonian is
H(t, x, y, z, ui,m1,m2, p, q, r¯) = s+ (c1y − ui)p+ c2yq + y
∫
Θ
c3r¯(t, θ)µ(dθ).
dp = E[−Hy(t+ τ)1lt≤T−τ | Ft]dt+ qdW (t) +
∫
r¯(t, dθ)N˜(dt, dθ),
p(T ) = gx(x(T )), (24)
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where Hy(t+τ) = c1(t+τ)p(t+τ)+c2(t+τ)q(t+τ)+
∫
Θ
c3(t+τ)r¯(t+τ, θ)µ(dθ).
We solve the solution explicitly with g(x) = c4x, c4 ≥ 0. p(T ) = c4 ≥ 0.
Between time T−τ and T, the stochastic process p(t) must solve dp = qdW (t)+∫
r¯(t, dθ)N˜(dt, dθ) and it should be Ft-measurable. Therefore p(t) = c4 on
t ∈ [T − τ, T ]. For t < T − τ, the processes q and r¯ are zero and p is entirely
deterministic and solves
p˙ = −c1(t+ τ)p(t+ τ).
Thus, for t ∈ [T − 2τ, T − τ ],
p(t) = p(T − τ) +
∫ T−τ
t
c1(t
′ + τ)p(t′ + τ) dt′.
This means that p(t) = c4[1 +
∫ T
t+τ
c1(t
′′) dt′′]. For t ∈ [T − (k + 1)τ, T − kτ ],
and (k + 1)τ ≤ T, one has p(t) = p(T − kτ) + ∫ T−(k−1)τ
t+τ
c1(t
′′)p(t′′) dt′′.
By assumption, sui(t, ui, ω) is decreasing in ui and from the above rela-
tionship it is clear that p is decreasing with τ. It follows that, if τ1 < τ2,
p[τ1](t) > p[τ2](t). We would like to solve sui(t, ui, ω) = p[τ1](t) > p[τ2](t). By
inverting the above equation one gets u∗i [τ1] < u
∗
i [τ2]. Thus, the optimal strategy
u∗i increases if the time delay τ increases.
This proves the following result:
Proposition 8. The time delay decreases the prosumer market price. The
optimal strategy u∗i increases as the time delay τ increases.
Numerical methods for delayed stochastic differential equations of mean-field
type is not without challenge. Here we implement the Milstein scheme using
MATLAB. We choose the following parameters γ = 0, c1 = c2 = c3 = 1 and set
the satisfaction function as
s(u) = 1− (1 + µm¯2)e−u
where µ > 0 and m¯2 is the average of all other agents’ control actions. A typical
shape of the satisfaction function is given in Figure 22. The optimal control is
u∗(t) = − log p(t)
1 + µm¯2(t)
1l(0,1](p(t)).
u∗(t) =

− log c41+µm¯2(t) on t ∈ (T − τ, T ],
− log c4(1+T−t−τ)1+µm¯2(t) on t ∈ (T − 2τ, T − τ ],
− 11+µm¯2(t) log[c4(1 + τ) + c4(1 + T − τ)(T − t− 2τ)− c42 (T − t− 2τ)(T + t)]
on t ∈ (T − 3τ, T − 2τ ].
The mean-field equilibrium solves the fixed-point equation E[u∗(t)] = m¯2(t).
Putting together one obtains
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m¯2(t) = − log p(t)
1 + µm¯2(t)
,
i.e., the root (in m¯2) of m¯2 7→ m¯2(1+µm¯2)+log p(t). The quadratic polynomial
has two roots: one positive and the other negative value. Since the consumption
is nonnegative, the mean of the mean-field control action is hence given by
m¯2(t) =
−1 +
√
1 + 4µ log[ 1p(t) ]
2µ
.
Notice that the effect of the time delay τ in this specific example was through
the adjoint process p which also enters into the control action u.
We plot the structure of the optimal strategy for T = 1, τ = 1/3, τ = 2/3.
The theoretical result of Proposition 2 is numerically observed in Figure 23.
Figure 24 plots sample optimal state trajectories for T = 1, τ = 1/3 using
Milstein scheme.
5 Decentralized Information and Partial Obser-
vation
Let FWt be the P-completed natural filtrations generated by W up to t. Set
FW := {FWt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and F := {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, where Ft = FWt ∨ σ(x0).
An admissible control ui of agent i is an FWi -adapted process with values
in a non-empty, closed and bounded subset (not necessarily convex) Ui of Rd
and satisfies E[
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt] <∞. Those are nonanticipative measurable func-
tionals of the Brownian motions. Since each agent has a different information
structure (decentralized information), let Ui be the set of admissible strate-
gies of i (with decentralized partial information) such that Gi,t ⊂ Fi,t, i.e.,
Ui := {ui ∈ L2Gi,T ([0, T ],Rd), ui(t, .) ∈ Ui P − a.s}. Given a strategy ui ∈ Ui,
and a (population) mean-field term m generated by other agents we consider
the signal-observation xui,mi which satisfies the following stochastic differential
equation of mean-field type to which we associate a best-response to mean-field
[158, 159, 132]:
supui∈Ui R(ui,m) subject to
dxi(t) = b(t, xi(t), Exi(t), ui(t),m(t))dt+ σ(t, xi(t), Exi(t), ui(t),m(t))dWi,t,
xi(0) ∼ L(Xi,0),
m(t) = population mean-field ,
(25)
b(t, x, y, u,m) : [0, T ]× Rd × Rd × Ui × Λ −→ R, (26)
σ(t, xi, yi, ui,m) : [0, T ]× R× R× Ui × Λ −→ R. (27)
R(ui,m) = g(xi(T ), Exi(T ),m(T )) +
∫ T
0
r(t, xi(t), Exi(t), ui(t),m(t))dt,
g is the terminal payoff and r is the running payoff. Given m, any u∗i ∈ Ui
which satisfies R(u∗i (·),m) = supui(·)∈Ui R(ui,m) is called a pure best-response
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strategy to m, by agent i. In addition to the other coefficient we assume that γ
satisfies H1. Under H1, the state dynamics admits a unique strong solution (see
[161], Proposition 1.2.) Given m, we apply the SMP for risk-neutral mean-field
type control from ([162], Theorem 2.1) to the state dynamics x to derive the
first order adjoint equation. Under the assumption H1, there exists a unique
F-adapted pair of processes (p, q), which solves the Backward SDE:
p(t) = gx(T ) + E[gy(T )] (28)
+
∫ T
t
{Hx(s) + E[Hy(s)]}ds
−
∫ T
t
q(s)dW (s),
such that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |p(t)|2 +
∫ T
0
|q(t)|2dt
]
< +∞. However, these processes
(p, q) may not be adapted to decentralized information Gi,t. This is why their
conditioning will appear in the maximum principle below. Again by ([162],
Theorem 2.1), there exists a unique F-adapted pair of processes (P,Q), which
solves the second order adjoint equation
P (t) = gxx(T ) (29)
+
∫ T
t
{2bx(s)P (s) + σ2xP (s) + 2σx(s)Q(s) +Hxx(s)}ds
−
∫ T
t
Q(s)dW (s), (30)
such that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |P (t)|2 +
∫ T
0
|Q(t)|2dt
]
< +∞. Note that in the multi-
dimensional setting, the term 2bx(s)P (s)+σ
2
xP (s)+2σx(s)Q(s) becomes b
′
xP +
Pbx + σ
′
xPσx + σ
′
xQ+Qσx.
Proposition 9. Let H1 holds and m be a given population mean-field profile.
If (x∗i , u
∗
i ) is a best-response then, there are two pairs of F-adapted processes
(p, q) and (P,Q) that satisfy (28) and (29) respectively, such that
i ∈ N : [δH(t) + 12δσ(t)′P (t)δσ(t) | Gi,t] ≤ 0, (31)
for all ui ∈ Ui, almost every t and P−almost surely, where,
δH(t) := H(t, x∗(t), ui,m(t), p(t), q(t))−H(t, x∗(t), u∗i (t),m(t), p(t), q(t)),
(32)
and Hk(t) := bk(t)p+ σk(t)q + rk(t), for k ∈ {x, y, xx}.
6 Limitations and Challenges
The examples above show that the continuum of agents assumption is rarely
observed in engineering practice. The agents are not necessarily symmetric and
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a single agent may have a non-negligible effect on the mean field terms as illus-
trated in the HVAC application. Without having a broad set of facts on which
to theorize, there is a certain danger of mean-field game models that are mathe-
matically elegant, yet have little connection to actual behavior observed in engi-
neering practice. At present, our empirical knowledge is inadequate to the main
assumptions of the classical mean-field game theory. This is why a relaxed ver-
sion is needed in order to better capture wide ranges of behaviors and constraints
observed in engineering systems. MFTG relaxations include symmetry break-
ing, mixture between atomic and nonatomic agents, non-negligible effect on
individual localized mean-field terms, and arbitrary number of decision-makers.
In addition, behavioral and psychological factors should be incorporated for
learning and information processes used by people-centric engineering systems.
MFTG is still under development and is far from being a well-established tool
for engineered systems. Until now, MFTG was not focused on behavioral and
cognitively-plausible models of choices in humans, robots, machines, mobile de-
vices and software-defined strategic interactions. Psychological and behavioral
mean-field type game theories seem to explain behaviors that are better cap-
tured in experiments or in practice than classical game-theoretic equilibrium
analysis. It allows to consider psychological aspects of the agent in addition to
the traditional ”material” payoff modelling. The value depends upon choice con-
sequences, mean-field states, mean-field actions and on beliefs about what will
happen. The psychological MFTG framework can link cognition and emotion.
It expresses emotions, guilt, empathy, altruism, spitefulness (maliciousness) of
the agents. It also include belief-dependent and other-regarding preferences in
the motivations. It needs to be investigated how much the psychology of the
people matters in their behaviors in engineering MFTGs. The answer to this
question is particularly crucial when analyzing the quality-of-experience of the
users in terms of MOS (mean opinion score) values. A preliminary result from
a recent experiment conducted in [111, 168] with 47 people carrying mobile
devices with WiFi direct and D2D technology shows that the participation in
forwarding the data of the users is correlated with their level of empathy to-
wards their neighbors. This suggests the use of not only material payoffs but
also non-material payoffs in order to better capture users behaviors. Another
aspect of MFTGs is the complexity of the analysis (both equilibrium and non-
equilibrium) when multiple agents (and multiple mean-field terms) are involved
in the interaction [169, 71, 160, 132, 170].
7 Conclusion and Future Work
The article presented basic applications of mean-field-type game theory in engi-
neering, covering key aspects such as de-congestion in intelligent transportation
networks, control of virus spread over network, multi-level building evacuation,
next generation wireless networks, incentive-based demand satisfaction in smart
energy systems, synchronization and coordination of nodes, mobile crowdsourc-
ing and cloud resource management. It appears from the wide ranges of ap-
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plications and coverage that mean-field-type game theory is a promising tool
for engineering problems. However, the framework is still under development
and needs to be improved to capture realistic behavior observed in practice.
Possible extensions of the work described in this article include the study of
mean-field-type games for risk engineering, and an integrated mean-field-type
game framework for smarter cities ranging from transportation to water dis-
tribution with ICT (Information Communication Technology), big data and
human-in-the-loop among several other interesting directions.
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Figure 8: The two upper figures plot the evolution of the number of remaining
agents in the building. The number of agents in ground floor starts increasing
because the flow is coming from first floor until certain time threshold and then
decrease when agents start to exit. The lower Figure plots the evolution of the
number of agents who have been evacuated safely. The plot has a typical shape
of a cumulative distribution function.
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Figure 9: A typical large-scale network with regular nodes, relay nodes, primary
users and jammers. The star sign represents a Jammer. The blue nodes are
active secondary nodes, the nodes in circle are inactive secondary nodes, and the
plus sign represents a primary user zone of transmission using MIMO millimeter
wave wireless communication.
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Figure 10: Optimal supply S∗j of producer j obtained by means of inf-
convolution of the Bellman operator
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Figure 11: Optimal Allocation
∑
k sjk(t) = S
∗
j (t) between the two power sta-
tions of producer j at time period t
Figure 12: Markov chain representation: the parameters si are the complement
of the other transitions.
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Figure 13: Proportion of dormant, corrupt and honest (followed by the corre-
sponding time-average trajectory). As time increases, the system approaches a
steady state.
Figure 14: Evolution of Reward (Honest) for the control parameters δm = 0.9
and δm = 0.1. The smaller the meeting/opening rate is the larger the proportion
of susceptible nodes.
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Figure 15: Network-based virus propagation: each agent has a certain degree
of connections without restriction on the location, capturing virus spread via
internet or social media contacts. The average degree of the graph is 4.
Figure 16: Kuramoto-based synchronization scheme with three clusters of align-
ment with 500 agents.
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Figure 17: A controlled Kuramoto-based synchronization scheme with 500
agents. A mean-field-type control helps to reach a consensus and an agreement
independently of the initial distribution of the phases.
Figure 18: Multi-robot game for protecting a convoy.
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Figure 19: Mobile car-like robot.
Figure 20: Convergence to comfort temperature between 23 and 25 degree cel-
sius (e.g. 73.4 and 77 Fahrenheit) for 10 connecting rooms in energy-efficient
buildings.
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Figure 21: Meeting room: initial distribution of the agents represented in 2D
Figure 22: Typical shape of the satisfaction function of the prosumer.
Figure 23: Structure of the Optimal Strategy for T = 1, τ = 1/3, τ = 2/3.
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Figure 24: Sample optimal state trajectories for T = 1, τ = 1/3 using Milstein
scheme.
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